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People are afraid to oppose the tribal council because so many of
them now work at the casino.., the council members run the casino,
and the council members sign their paychecks. Anyone who chal-
lenges them pays for it. - Marty Silvas, former Tigua t
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Think not forever of yourselves, 0 Chiefs, nor of your own genera-
tion. Think of continuing generations of our families, think of our
grandchildren and of those yet unborn, whose faces are coming from
beneath the ground.
* I wish to thank the following people: my editors, Marie Galindo. Norma Ortiz,
Katherine Ramos and Sylvia Kim Rhee, for their assistance, patience and for seeing a
coherent article where I saw only a garbled stew of facts and indignation; Colleen Garrity,
Michael Abernethy, and all others who endured my thinking-out-loud at odd hours of the
night; my parents, Enrique and Manuela Saucedo, for imbuing in me a respectful
skepticism of all things unquestionable (whether they realized it or not), and to Ray L
Telles, for having more faith in my work than I ever did. This comment is dedicated to the
memory of comedian Bill Hicks. "But I hate a lie, Cass. My own most of all. They keep
us crawlin' in the dust when we could an' should be climbin' for the stars. Bill Hicks knew
that, didn't he? An' a guy who'll tell the truth in this bullshit world, he's worth his weight
in gold."- Garth Ennis
1. Pamela Colloff, The Blood of the Tigua, Tex. Morr1ilLY, August 1999, at 112, 132.
2. See American Indian Research and Policy Institute, Threats to Tribal Sovereignty
Are Nothing New, at http'//vww.airpi.org/st98notnew.hml (last visited Oct. 3. 2000) (quot-
ing HARVEY ARDEN & STEVE WALL, WISDOMKEEI'ERS: MEETINGS Wmi NAnVP Ahm-m-
CAN SPIRITUAL ELDERS (Beyond Words (1990)).
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I. IN'RODUCTION
It is difficult to place the history of interaction between the United
States federal government and Native American tribes in any positive
terms. Many of us grew up with the myth of Indians and White settlers
living amicably as neighbors, even sharing the fruits of the Indians' larder
on the first Thanksgiving. As we grew older, we learned that these same
settlers deliberately tried to infect their neighbors with smallpox-tainted
blankets,3 used legal and illegal methods to remove Indians from their
homelands,4 and often condoned the massacre of women and children in
the name of Manifest Destiny.5
3. See DONALD R. HOPKINS, PRINCES AND PEASANTS: SMALLPOX IN His'rORY 246
(1983). Some European settlers tried to intentionally contaminate the Indians so as to
reduce their numbers, even though most smallpox transmissions to Indians were inadver-
tent. See id. Hopkins describes one such incident:
Probably the most notorious instance of smallpox being deliberately recommended as
a weapon against North American Indians occurred when Sir Jeffrey Amherst, coin-
mander-in-chief of British forces in North America, became concerned about a coali-
tion of Indian tribes led by the Ottawa chief Pontiac that was harassing the western
frontiers of Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia ... Amherst suggested in a letter
written to Colonel Henry Bouquet in 1763, 'Could it not be contrived to send small-
pox among these disaffected tribes of Indians? We must oil this occasion use every
stratagem in our power to reduce them.' That July, Bouquet replied: 'I will try to
inoculate the Indians with some blankets that may fall in their hands, and take care
not to get the disease myself.' Id. The result of the conspiracy is unknown. See id.
4. See Theda Perdue, The Trail of Tears: Removal of the Southern Indians, in Tim.
AMERICAN INDIAN EXPERIENCE: A PROFILE: 1524 TO THE PRESENT 108-10 (Philip Weeks
ed., 1988). The State of Georgia sought to remove the Cherokee from their lands within
the state in order to free up acreage for cotton production. See id. at 108-09. This end was
accomplished through the passage of laws, which made continued residence within the
state intolerable. See id. These laws prohibited the Cherokee from mining gold on their
land; prohibited Cherokee from testifying against Whites in court; enjoined the Cherokee
council from meeting; and prohibited Cherokee leaders from speaking publicly against re-
inoval. See id. at 109. Around the same time, Congress responded to the demands of
southern states that more Indian land be freed up for agricultural exploitation by passing
the Indian Removal Act in 1830. See id. at 108-09. Drafted with the intent of encouraging
Indians to move westward, The Indian Removal Act authorized the president to negotiate
exchanges of territory with the Indians and appropriated $500,000 for that purpose. See id.
at 109. In 1832, the U.S. Supreme Court in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832) enjoined Georgia from enforcing state law upon Cherokee land. See id. at Ill.
Georgia responded by simply ignoring the decision, and President Andrew Jackson chose
not to enforce it). See id. at 111.
5. See ROBERT M. UTLEY, CAVALIER IN BUCKSKIN: GEORGE ARMSTRONG Cusm
AND THE WESTERN MILITARY FRONTIER 60-77 (1998). In fact, 'complete annihilation' was
seen as an acceptable means of depopulating the West of native peoples. See id. By 1868,
public sentiment regarding the Indians had split into two factions: the Easterners tended to
favor policies of conciliation, kindness and tolerance towards the Indians (who would then
be more submissive), while most Westerners felt that a military solution was the only way
to effectively address the issue. See id. Either way, the goal of both groups was the same:
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Over time, the federal government shifted from a policy of annihilation
to one of containment and assimilation.6 This removed many native peo-
ples from their indigenous lands, and placed them in reservations where
their populations could be controlled and they could be taught the ways
of a more civilized, genteel society.7 The result of this was a loss of many
Indian traditions and abject poverty on the reservations, much of which
continues today.8 Again, the federal government has switched gears on
its Indian policy. Realizing that poverty is one of the most pressing issues
facing Indian tribes today, the federal government has adopted a general
to clear the plains between tile Platte and Arkansas Rivers of all Indians and relocate them
to areas outside tile region. See id. Generals Philip H. Sheridan and George Armstrong
Custer were both Civil War veterans and well-versed in the art of "total war," in which
civilian populations would be subjected to the horrors of war so as to destroy the enemy's
ability and will to fight. See id. at 60. Now they planned the same treatment for the Indi-
ans - search them out in their winter camps, kill or drive them from their lodges: destroy
their ponies, food and shelter; and hound them mercilessly across a frigid landscape until
they gave up. See id. If women and children fell victim to such methods, it was regrettable,
but justified because it resolved the issue quickly and decisively and thus more humanely.
See id. Robert M. Utley describes the effect of this policy on Indian women and children
with an examination of the Battle of Washita in 1868, which established General Custer's
reputation as the nation's preeminent Indian fighter. "The Washita typified a reality of
Indian warfare that all frontier commanders had to face ... Total war subjected women,
children and old people to death or cruel suffering. Surprise attack on an Indian village,
centerpiece of the strategy of total war, inevitably struck down noncombatants. Women
and children were killed at the Washita, rarely deliberately, except by the Indian scouts,
but accidentally in the tumult of combat and in self defense. TIhe destruction of property,
food and transportation, followed by weeks of fearful flight to avoid the soldiers, forced
women and children to endure terrible hardship. Most officers, including Custer, lamented
such measures but believed them a necessary evil." Id. at 77.
6. See Donald J. Berthrong, The Bitter Years: Western hIdian Reservation Lift, in Tie
AMERICAN INDIAN EXPERIENCE: A PRoFii.ti: 1524 To Ttu Pitstutr 156 (Philip Weeks
ed., 1988).
7. See id. In 1877, Indian Commissioner E. A. Hayt stated that there was "little hope
of the civilization of the older, wild Indian, and the only question is how to control or
govern him, so that his savage instincts shall be kept from violent outbreaks." Id. Govern-
ment officials saw focusing "governmental programs on 'partially civilized' adult Indians,
and especially on children" more feasible. Id. In time the Indian youth would abandon the
"barbarism, idolatry and savage life." Id.
8. See Bill Richardson, The Need to Empower Indian Tribes, USA 'OI)A'" (Maga-
zine), Nov. 1, 1994 at 54. Indian reservations illustrate some of the most severe examples
of poverty in the United States. See id. "he Bureau of Indian Affairs denotes that approx-
imately 93,000 Native Americans are homeless or underhoused. See id. Twenty percent of
Indian homes lack toilets, and half do not have telephones. See id. Of 1,800.000 Native
Americans, 603,000 live below the poverty line, including 85,000 under the age of five. See
id. Indian youth have the highest school dropout rate of any minority group at 35.5%. See
id. Unemployment on reservations always has exceeded 50% nationally and is over 80%
on some reservations. See id.
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policy of self-sufficiency.9 The tribes can only emerge from this current
morass through economic development of their reservations. Gaming'0
has emerged as one of the most visible and controversial means of accom-
plishing this goal.1 '
In 1988, Congress opened the gaming doors to Indian reservations with
the passage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (hereinafter
"IGRA"). 12 IGRA came about after more than a decade of fighting be-
tween tribes and the states over the ability of states to constrain on-reser-
vation economic enterprises. 3 IGRA provides a federal sanction to
tribes that allows them to conduct gaming enterprises on their reserva-
tions in order to improve their general welfare.' 4 It also places limita-
tions on the use of revenue generated by these operations.' 5 Through
IGRA, the Indian tribes acquired a federally-created means of generating
revenue through gaming enterprises. This increased revenue has created
a great incentive to be a recognized tribal member. Being a recognized
member of a tribe involved in gaming entitles that member to some very
tangible benefits, one of which is a portion of the revenues generated by
gaming enterprises.16 As a result of IGRA, many tribes today generate
enormous sums of revenue.1 7
9. See U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Mission Statement,
at http:I/www.doi.gov/bia/mission.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2000). The Bureau of Indian
Affairs seeks to "enhance the quality of life, to promote economic opportunity, and to
carry out the responsibility to protect and improve the trust assets of American Indians,
Indian tribes and Alaska Natives." Id. Furthermore, the agency's mission is to accomplish
these things by delivering quality services that maintain "government-to-government rela-
tionships within the spirit of Indian self-determination." Id.
10. Gaming is defined as playing at "any game for money or property; in short to
stake money or property on a chance." BALLENTINE'S LAw DICr1ONARY 513 (3d ed.
1969).
11. See Dennis McAuliffe, Jr., Casinos Deal Indians A Winning Hand; Billions in Rev-
enue Ease Tribes' Dependence on Federal Funds, WASH. PosT, Mar. 5, 1996, at Al. Con-
gress has specifically limited tribal spending resulting from operating gaming enterprises;
namely, the "social, welfare and economic-assistance programs historically regarded as
Washington's responsibility to Indians under treaties and the ensuing federal trust relation-
ship with the tribes." Id. After these essential needs are met, the tribe is free to divide the
profits among its members. See id.
12. 25 U.S.C.A. § 2701 (West Supp. 2000).
13. See Eric Henderson, Ancestry and Casino Dollars in the Fornation of Tribal Iden-
tity, 4 RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L. J. 7, 10 (1998).
14. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 2702 (West Supp. 2000).
15. See id § 2710 (b)(2)(B).
16. See id. § 2710 (b)(3). This section allows for per capita payments of net revenues
of class II gaming to individual members of the tribe with several restrictions on those
payments. See id.
17. See David Pace, Casinos Bring Money, Hope to Indians, BosroN GLOBE, Sept. 3,
2000, at A10. Gambling money has increased from $100 million in 1988 to $8.6 billion. See
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The tribes have managed to bring gaming onto their reservations
through the historical respect for tribal sovereignty. Since the inception
of the notion of tribal sovereignty, the federal government has generally
refrained from passing laws that invade the sovereign power of the tribe
on matters of internal importance. 8 The U.S. Supreme Court has like-
wise refused to interfere in the internal decision-making process of tribes.
That trend is illustrated in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez 9 where the
Court affirmed the historical view of tribal governments as "distinct, in-
dependent political communities, retaining their original natural rights in
matters of local government. ',20
Accompanying this notion of respect for tribal sovereignty is the need
to protect the individual tribal member from the excesses of the tribal
government. The federal government recognized this need by creating
the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (hereinafter "ICRA"). 21 Unlike the
Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution, which limits the power of the fed-
eral government for the benefit of citizens, ICRA serves two purposes: it
defines the boundaries of tribal actions regarding the rights of individu-
als,2 - while simultaneously promoting the well established policy of fur-
thering Indian self-government.23
Although the passage of ICRA has produced a deluge of cash into In-
dian reservations,24 it, coupled with the historic goals of tribal autonomy
and sovereignty over tribal matters, has created the potential for massive
id. Tribes like the Mille Lacs Band and the Gila River are two of twenty-three tribes across
the country owning casinos that grossed more than $100 million in 1988. See id. Those
twenty-three together accounted for fifty-six percent of total Indian gaming revenues that
year. See id.
18. U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs: 77Te Basis for the Gov-
ernment-to-Government Relationship Between the United States and Tribal Nations, (last
visited July 4, 2000), at http'/www.doi.govbia/govtogov.html. In order to enter into trea-
ties with Indian tribes, there had to be an acceptance of several concepts: first, the tribes
were to be considered a sovereign nation; second, the tribes were responsible for their
internal affairs; and third, any relations with the tribes were to be handled by the central
government and considered as between two nations. See id. However, by 1832, tribal sov-
ereignty had been limited as a result of an agreement by the tribes to regard themselves as
being under the protection of the United States. See id. Also, tribes agreed to forego their
external sovereignty and acknowledge legislative Powers of Congress over them. See id.
19. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
20. Id. at 55 (citing to Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515. 559 (1832)).
21. See 25 U.S.C.A. ch. 15 (West Supp. 2000).
22. See id. § 1302.
23. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974). See also Ramos v. Pyramid
Tribal Ct., 621 F. Supp. 967, 970 (D. Nev. 1985) (stating that the Court must construe terms
in the Indian Civil Rights Act "with due regard for historical, governmental and cultural
values of an Indian tribe").
24. See Pace, supra note 17. The explosion of gambling money, from $100 million in
1988 to $8.6 billion in 1998 triggered a debate in Indian country over whether casino profits
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abuses of the rights of individual tribal members. The events that oc-
curred in Texas on the Tigua Indian Reservation in the Fall of 1997 and
Spring 1998 illustrate this danger.
This comment examines the problems that can erupt when an Indian
tribe is left unaccountable for actions directed toward individual tribal
members. It also proposes a solution that attempts to both protect the
rights of individual Indians, and preserve the indigenous tribal law and
culture that the policies of autonomy and tribal sovereignty seek to
promote.
II. THE TIGUAS
Like many of those who reside in the El Paso area, the Tigua are, in a
greater historical sense, immigrants. Their origins as indigenous people
lie not in the rust-colored crags of the Franklin Mountains, but about 270
miles to the north. Indeed, they are in Texas because they found them-
selves, either by choice or by conscription, on the losing side of a war.
The Tigua are a tribe of the Pueblo (a tribe believed descended from
the Anasazi, a now extinct people known for their spectacular mud-and-
stone cliff dwellings dotting the American Southwest).25 The Anasazi
flourished in Northern New Mexico and the Four Corners region circa 1
A.D., after which they mysteriously vanished.26 While many myths and
legends exist to explain what happened to the Anasazi, it is widely be-
lieved that a combination of war, failed harvests and climactic change
forced them out of their canyon strongholds and into the flatlands, where
some groups became the Pueblo.
The Tigua Pueblo's first encounter with Europeans came in 1540 A.D.,
when Spanish explorer Fransisco Vasquez de Coronado came upon them
in northern New Mexico while searching for the Seven Cities of Cibola.28
should be returned directly to tribal members or reinvested in the community for such
items as schools, housing and public works. See id.
25. See Colloff, supra note 1, 115.
26. See Why Anasazi?, Montezuma County Economic Development Council, at http:/l
www.swcolo.org/Tourism/ArcheologyHome.html (last visited Oct. 14, 1999); Anasazi Ar-
chaeology, Montezuma County Economic Development Council at http://www.swcolo.org/
Tourism/ArcheologyHome.html (last visited Oct. 14, 1999).
27. See John Kautner, Sipapu - Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.sipapu.gsu.
edu/html/faq.html (last visited Oct. 17, 1999) (describing the origins of the Pueblo people).
28. See BILL WRIGHT, TuE TIGUAS: PUEBLO INDIANS OF TEXAS 5 (1993). It was the
myth of the Seven Cities of Cibola that drove early Spanish exploration into North
America. See also Addison Ervin Sheldon, History and Stories of Nebraska History: The
Story of Coronado at http://www.ukans.edu/-kansitelhun/books/nbstory/storyl.htnl (last
visited Oct. 4, 2000). The Spanish conquistador Fransisco Vasquez Coronado first heard
tales of the existence of the seven cities somewhere to the north of Mexico, "with houses
built of stone many stories high, and great abundance of gold and silver, turquoises, cloth,
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Like other Pueblo Indians, the Tigua lived in adobe dwellings and had an
agricultural-based economy.29 The tribe's situation changed drastically in
1598, when Spanish explorer Don Juan de Ofiate forcibly tried to convert
them to Catholicism and to subject them to Spanish rule.3" Many of the
Pueblo tribes revolted, and in 1680, they drove the Spanish out of north-
ern New Mexico. 3 As the Spanish fled southward along the Rio Grande,
they were accompanied by about 317 Tiguas.3 2 Whether these Tiguas fol-
lowed the Spanish voluntarily or were taken against their will is unclear."
The Spanish and Tigua eventually settled in Ysleta del Sur, which is now
present-day El Paso County, Texas.34 The Spanish immediately began
sheep, cows and tame partridges," from a Spanish monk, who had traveled extensively
through North America. Id. Coronado quickly assembled an army of three hundred
Spaniards and a thousand Indians, and headed north from Mexico to find these cities in
1540. See id. Coronado wandered across present present-day Arizona. New Mexico. Kan-
sas and Nebraska before conceding that there were no Seven Cities, and returned unsuc-
cessfully to Mexico in 1541. See id.
29. See WRIGHT, supra note 28 (stating that "additional reports concerning the Tiguas
said they 'ate corn, beans and melons, used skins of animals for clothes and made long
robes of feathers and cotton"').
30. See id. at 8. "In 1598, the Indians of New Mexico encountered the expedition that
would change their lives forever, for the viceroy of Mexico had given Don Juan de Ollate
permission to colonize the northern boundaries of the empire, now the states of Texas and
New Mexico." Id. On 30 April [15981 near El Paso, Governor Ofiate pronounced his
possession of all of New Mexico and Texas for the Spanish King... jOfiate's group was]
well received by the Indians they encountered. See id. Tle padres communicated the
Catholic faith to the natives as they traveled, and Ofilate established Spanish rule over the
people. See id.
31. See id. at 10. The Christianized Pueblo population, under control of the Spanish,
numbered about 35,000. See id. In contrast, the population of Spaniards and Franciscian
priests numbered around 2,832. See id. The attack, on August 15, 1680, was launched by
the Indians to rid themselves of the forced labor and religious persecution that the Spanish
had made a part of the colonization process. See id.
32. See id.
33. Compare Tigna Indians, at http'.//www.cs.utep.eduielpasoltiguas.htmi (last visited
August 28, 2000) (stating that "[n]obody knows for sure if the first group of Tiguas who
came to the area willingly or not but members of the second group of Tiguas were brought
as prisoners and slaves [sic]. For fifty or sixty years there were numerous rebellions of
Tiguas trying to leave the El Paso area....") with WiRtiamrsupra note 28, at 10 (stating that
"[ulpon finding the Isleta pueblo abandoned, the northern group [of retreating Spaniards!
continued south where they joined the others [Spaniards from a separate group, who began
retreating from the area upon hearing of the northern group's defeat[, along with 317
friendly Tiguas from Isleta, and continuing on, established a temporary settlement in the
area of present El Paso") (emphasis added).
34. See WRIGHT, supra note 28, at 10. Due to the failure of an attempt in 1681 to
reclaim the Indian pueblos lost to the Indians in 1680, the Spanish returned to El Paso,
where Spanish Governor Otermin decreed that the settlement at El Paso del Note would
henceforth be permanent. See id.
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building a mission church for the Tiguas. 35 The Tiguas, in turn, went to
work cultivating the land.3 6
Although King Charles V of Spain granted the Tiguas title to a 36
square mile parcel of land,3 7 the tribe lost most of their land resources.
The decline in the tribe's resources is largely due to state-sanctioned land
seizures by White homesteaders, 38 the Salt Wars of 1877,3 attacks by ri-
val Indian tribes,40 and more recently, intermarriage with the local His-
panic population.41  By the 1960's the tribe was nearly extinct.
35. See id. at 11. "Between 1681 and 1691 the Spanish erected the original Ysleta
mission to serve the Tigua Indian population... a devastating flood swept much of the
mission structure away in 1740, but it was rebuilt between 1740 and 1744. The present
mission stands on the original foundation and incorporates some of the original wall." Id.
36. See id. at 13. The Tiguas applied themselves to the cultivation of the land under
the protection of the Spanish and continued to serve the padres in various capacities. See
id. In a letter from 1754, Fray Manuel San Juan Nepomuceno y Trigro, describes the culti-
vation practices: "The Indians... have their gardens adorned with beautiful grape vines,
peach trees, apple trees, and good vegetables and the garden of the convent imitates them
in providing delight to the eyes and satisfaction to the taste. All the cultivation is due to
the annual presence of a gardener, provided by the sons [of the mission], who come to the
convent every week with the boys needed for the daily cleansing of the cells; they also
provide the other workers-a bell ringer, porter, cook, two sacristans, and the Indian wo-
men needed to grind the wheat". Id.
37. See Colloff, supra note 1, at 115.
38. See WRIGHT, supra note 28, at 16. Wright describes a scheme in which Anglo land
speculators attempted to drive the Tigua off their land by speaking to the Texas Legislature
to incorporate a 36 square-mile area which included land deeded to the Tigua by the Span-
ish. See id. Under the terms of incorporation, the new municipality had the power to deed
tracts to non-Indians without compensating the tribe and impose astronomical taxes on
Indian-held lands so as to force the Indians into default, thus giving tile municipality an
excuse to confiscate the land. See id. Though the incorporation was declared illegal in
1874, "land transactions that occurred during the interim period were not revoked, and the
Indians were effectively removed from possession of their grant and aboriginal holdings."
Id.
39. See id. Wright notes that prior to 1877, the Tiguas relied on vast dry lakes at the
foot of the Guadalupe Mountains in west Texas to supply them with salt necessary for food
preservation, seasoning and trade. See id. In 1877, a local Anglo judge, a corrupt Catholic
priest and others attempted to gain control of the salt flats and to deny the Indians access
to them. See id. War between the Indians and the salt speculators broke out, and the
Indians were ultimately cut off from access to the salt flats. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 27. Since their first encounter with the Spanish, the Tiguas have sur-
mounted many obstacles to survive as a tribe. Other Pueblo groups were absorbed into the
local population and disappeared as distinct cultures, but the Tiguas have remained; they
have held fast to their cultural identity even though they have lost most of their language
and intermarried with other Indians and Hispanics. See id. Now intermarriage poses a
formidable problem. Under the federal government's terms of trusteeship, persons must
have a "blood quantum" of at least one-eighth Tigua ancestry to be carried on tile tribal
rolls. See id. Because the tribe is so small, it is virtually impossible to marry within the
tribe without marrying a cousin. See id. Most of the young people reject this option and
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Anthropological linguist Jerry Gathings studied the tribe and noted that
he was witnessing "the final days of a moribund culture... Only a few
people identified themselves as [Tigua] Indians, and virtually no one
knew the language. ',
42
The situation of the Tiguas began to change for the better when the
State of Texas formally recognized the tribe under the Texas Commission
for Indian Affairs in 1967."3 One year later, the Tigua Indians received
Federal recognition as a tribe.44 This recognition marked the transforma-
tion of what had once been an impoverished backwater of El Paso
County into a sovereign nation. Today the tribe is composed of approxi-
mately 1500 members residing on forty-seven acres in the Lower Valley
area of southeast El Paso.4 5
III. THE CURRENT CRISIS4 6
The story begins in 1993, a few years after IGRA provided a statutory
basis for gaming on Indian reservations as a way to promote economic
development, self-sufficiency, and strong government for the tribe.47
That year, the tribe tried to negotiate with Texas Governor Ann Richards
for gaming on the reservation, but their efforts were unsuccessful.' 8 De-
spite a lack of state approval, the tribe erected a bingo hall (the Speaking
marry outside the tribe, ensuring that sooner or later the general blood quantum will be
diluted below the statutory limit. See id.
42. Colloff, supra note 1, at 116.
43. See WRIGhT, supra note 28, at 24.
44. See An Act Relating to the Tiwa Indians of Texas, Pub. L No. 90-287.82 Stat. 93
(1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
45. See Colloff, supra note 1, at 115-16, 128; see also Bryan Wooley, Bloodline: If We
Could Bottle Our Indianness and Sell It, We Would Be Rich, Says a Leader of El Paso's
7gua Tribe. Of Course They Can't - But Casino Gambling Could Be the Next Best Thing,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 3, 1994, at 6. The remnants of the Tigua tribal lands are
now only a tiny reservation and the approximately 1500 people on the tribal membership
roll strive to preserve their tradition and culture. Id.
46. While I have strived to obtain support for the facts in this section from
independent primary sources, I must attribute the factual flow (and primary inspiration for
this comment) to the article by Pamela Colloff, The Blood of the 7lgua, Tr~x. Mo.nirxt.y
Aug. 1999, at 112.
47. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 2702 (1) (West Supp. 2000).
48. See State Briefs, Indians Plan to File Suit, Hous. CIIRON.. Apr. 3, 1993, at A30.
The suit alleged that the state failed to negotiate with the tribe in good faith regarding the
opening of a casino on the Tigua reservation. See id. T'lhen-Governor Ann Richards re-
plied that "she does not believe the law allows her to authorize any gambling beyond what
is already available." Id.
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Rock Casino) and added poker, blackjack, and pull-tab gaming.49 Today,
the casino generates enormous sums of money for the tribe, with re-
ported gross annual revenues of approximately $60 million.5" Casino
profits fund the salaries of tribal leaders, subsidize reservation housing,
provide free health care and college tuition, and give each registered
member of the tribe a yearly stipend that, in 1998, amounted to $15,000.1,
The casino and its profits have become, according to tribal governor
Vince Mufioz, "the new buffalo."52
The Tigua conflict had innocent, even celebratory, origins in 1990,
when Marty Silvas, at age 27, became the youngest person ever named
war captain and safekeeper of the juanchido, one of the tribe's most sa-
cred relics.53 In 1993, Manny Silvas, Marty's brother, and the tribe's lieu-
tenant governor, fell under the tribal council's suspicion for allegedly
misappropriating $70,000 of tribal funds.5 4 As a result of this suspicion,
the tribal council discussed prohibiting Manny from running for re-elec-
tion.5 Chief Enrique Paiz supported Manny and argued that the charges
were groundless. Nevertheless, the council voted to prohibit Manny from
running for re-election.56 In response to Paiz's show of support for
Manny, the council stripped Paiz of his office, an act never before com-
mitted, much less contemplated, since the chief was purportedly the ulti-
mate authority. 57 In reaction to the tribal council's actions toward his
49. See Colloff, supra note 1, at 128 (describing the tribe's actions, which brought
various forms of gaming to the tribe, despite the lack of approval by Texas Governor Am
Richards).
50. See Ruling Frees Tribe to Evict Members Deemed Less Than One-Eighth Indian -
Judge Withdraws Order Stemming Lawsuit by About 20 Families, DALLAS MORNINa Nt.ws,
Dec. 16, 1998, at 25A.
51. See Colloff, supra note 1, at 128.
52. See id. The term "the new buffalo" is a metaphor Tigua Governor Muiloz uses
which analogizes casino gaming profits with buffalo herds from earlier days. See also
Laura Laughlin, Casinos Called "New Buffalo for the Indians: Arizona Tribes Reaping Ben-
efits; Others Warn of Gambling's Pitfalls, DALLAS MORNINo NEws, May 29, 1994, at 45A.
See also Wooley, supra note 45 (quoting Marty Silvas as saying "The gambling is our white
buffalo... In the old days, the buffalo was the Indians' housing, it was our clothing, it was
our food, everything we needed. We need something to hold the future. We need some-
thing to take care of our children"). While Silvas' wording is different from Munoz', Ihe
buffalo metaphor and the message it conveys is the same: gambling has emerged as the
Indian tribes' new means of sustenance.
53. See Colloff, supra note 1, at 130-31. The juanchido is a drum that the Tiguas be-
lieve is used by the tribe's ancestors to communicate to the current generation, and it is
often consulted on important matters and issues facing the Tribe. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 131.
56. See id.
57. See id. Today, the position of Tigua chief is largely ceremonial. See id. While the
chief is the tribe's spiritual guide and has absolute authority over tribal matters until his
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brother and Chief Paiz, Marty demanded that the tribal council step
down, and he hid the juanchido and other sacred objects.58
The tribal council attempted to recover the objects by filing suit against
Marty in federal court, and later offering a $50,000 reward for return of
the items.59 The case, however, was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
since the tribe was considered its own nation.60 The council's inability to
recover the items, compounded by Marty's refusal to participate in a
tribe-sanctioned ceremony, lead the council to remove him from the tri-
bal rolls and send armed tribal police to remove him from the reservation
in May of 1996.6' According to Marty, the officers demanded at gunpoint
that he reveal where he had hidden the items.62 When he refused, he was
driven by car to the edge of the reservation and told that he was "no
longer a part of these people... [he did not] belong here anymore."'
The tribe's wealth and the Governor's (Munoz) power had grown con-
siderably by 1996; in November, the casino added slot machines, and
Munoz was named gaming commissioner."4 It was at this point that the
conflict began to extend beyond the immediate clash between Marty Sil-
vas and the tribal council. Many families in the tribe begin to take sides
and those who sided with Marty feared retaliation.6 The tribal leaders
confirmed the families' fears when they announced they would re-ex-
amine the tribal rolls in order to correct disparities created by the inclu-
sion (in tribal membership) of those who did not meet blood-line
requirements. Those who lacked the minimum blood requirements were
to be removed from tribal rolls.66
It is important to note that the requisite amount of blood necessary to
be considered Indian is one-eighth, a number set by Congress almost a
decade ago.67 The Tigua is one tribe that did not determine its blood
death, that power is rarely, if ever, invoked. See id. Instead, the tribal governor is the one
responsible for managing the casino and, consequently, the tribe's economic fortune and
power. See id.
58. See id. See also Laura Smitherman, Tiguas Get Back Long.Missiiig Sacred Drum,
Artifacts, EL PASo Times, Mar. 16, 1999, at IA (referring to some of the other missing
artifacts, including several religious masks known as Los Abuelos).
59. See Texas Tribe's Dispute Ties Aritifacts Up, DAI.LAS MORNINo Nrws. Dec. 14.
1996, at 39A.
60. See id.
61. See Colloff, supra note 1, at 131.
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 128.
65. See id. at 131.
66. See Tiguas Cut Front Tribe Face Hardship - Federal Benefits, Housing at Risk As
Leaders Try to Enforce Ancestry Rules, DALLAS MohtNiNo Nn.ws, June 16, 1998, at 17A.
67. See Nedra Pickier, Tribal Membership - Harder to Wini with Casino Riches the
Prize, CHi. TRw., Aug. 31, 1999, at C2. Most tribal constitutions require a certain blood
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quantum, but had it dictated to it by the federal government. 6 Even
more importantly, in February 1997, the tribal council discussed plans to
resurrect an unsuccessful attempt to reduce the blood quantum from one-
eighth to one-sixteenth in order to boost the tribe's population and pre-
vent it from dying out.6 9
The story of Grace Vela involves the issue of blood quantum and is an
extreme example of tendentious tribal authority exerted over Vela and
other individual tribal members for siding with Marty Silvas.7° Vela's
brother was Marty's friend, and her family had opposed the tribal council
in past elections.7 Although Vela had been listed as Tiguan on tribal
rolls for more than twenty years, her lineage was suddenly an issue for
tribal leaders.7" Pamela Colloff, author of the Texas Monthly article,
"Blood of the Tigua," states that Vela was an unlikely candidate for
blood-quantum re-evaluation:
[S]he had lived on the reservation for eighteen years and had worked
there since 1977, directing many of the tribe's social service pro-
grams. Her mother, 68-year-old Natalia Lopez, was the godchild of
the revered Tigua chief Mariano Colmenero and had grown up in a
small adobe house shaded by pomegranate trees in a part of east El
Paso that later became reservation land. Vela was included in the
tribal rolls when they were first compiled in 1967; twenty years later,
when the Tigua received federal recognition, she was again listed in
the tribal rolls - a register that the Texas Indian Commission had
spent seven years researching and described as 'the most thorough,
exhaustive, and complete determination of who is and who can legiti-
mately be considered a Tigua.'73
Despite the weight of this evidence, the tribal council's census depart-
ment notified Vela, her mother, and other family members that they
quantum - or proportion of Indian lineage - for membership. See id. See also Suzie Siegel,
Reclaiming a Lost Legacy; American Indian Heritage Month Highlights the Search Many
Women and Men Are Conducting to Reclaim their Ancestral Ties and Culture, The Tampa
Trib., Nov. 14, 1994, Baylife at 1. Siegel summarizes Scott L. Peeler, a researcher of Indian
genealogy: "Tribes set membership requirements. Being listed as Indian on a census or
birth certificate is not enough. [The tribes] want proof that you are a direct descendent of
someone on their membership rolls.... Most also stipulate a 'blood quantum.' The major-
ity [of tribes] require that your ancestry be at least a quarter tribal ..... Id.
68. See Tiguas Cut From Tribe Face Hardship, supra note 66.
69. See Tigta Leaders May Revive Attempt to Reduce Native-Blood Requirement,
DALLAS MORNING NEws, Feb. 17, 1997, at 19A.
70. See Colloff, supra note 1, at 132.
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lacked sufficient Tigua blood, and thus were no longer members of the
tribe.74 Vela appealed the decision by referring to an 1873 Tigua land
survey entitled 'We the Indians,' that was signed by her great-great-
grandfather and an 1895 tribal compact signed by her great-great-grand-
mother's brother.75 The tribal census department rejected her appeal,
claiming that the documents were suspect because they did not establish
the blood quantums of Vela's ancestors, much less their "Indianness."76
The conflict between Marty Silvas and the tribal council became more
acrimonious in April 1998, when he was indicted for felony theft of the
juanchido and other sacred objects.7 7 He was tried in state court and
acquitted on November 5, after the jury accepted the defense's argument
that Marty, "in his lifetime position as the war captain, was the drum's
rightful owner and could not have stolen [the itemsl." 78 Vela's younger
brother had prepared to testify on Marty's behalf as a character witness,
and Vela's sister sat in on the trial in an additional show of support for
Marty.79
The day after the jury acquitted Marty Silvas, Vela and several of
Marty's supporters were fired from their reservation jobs." Four days
later, they were officially banished from the tribe for lacking the requisite
amount of Tigua blood and were told they had thirty days to leave the
reservation.8" While some of the banished families accepted small mone-
tary settlements from the tribe and left the reservation voluntarily, Vela
and seven other families decided to stay.' The courts would be of no
help. In December 1998, the banished families filed suit in state district
court to prevent the tribe from removing them from the reservation.
Nevertheless, the suit, based on civil rights violations, was dismissed.'
In the wake of the ruling, the tribe was free to remove the banished
families who remained on the reservation and began to do so by essen-
tially "laying siege" to their homes.84 Colloff describes the actions of the
Tigua police in her article:
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 131-32
77. See Former Texas Tribal Official Indicted-Man Charged With Theft of 7igua Indian
Artifacts, DALLAS MORNING Nemvs, April 9, 1998, at 16A.





83. See Ruling Frees Tribe, supra note 50.
84. See Colloff, supra note 1, at 132.
20001
THE SCHOLAR
Tribal police officers erected chain-link fences around the reserva-
tion's housing complex in late December, blockading streets and
posting officers at its entrance; any banished tribe members trying to
enter were turned back, and those who ventured out to take their
children to school or to head to work were forced to scale the chain-
link fences under cover of darkness to get back inside. [Grace] Vela
kept her blinds drawn and her lights out, subsisting on food that her
sister threw over the barricades."
The tribal police increased the pressure after Christmas. By January
1999 they began shining floodlights into Grace Vela's windows, and by
February, her water had been turned off. 6 On February 18, tribal police
officers armed with shotguns and revolvers knocked down Vela's door,
handcuffed her, and escorted her off the reservation.87
Tribal Governor Munoz insisted that the tribe's actions in re-examining
the membership rolls were not to consolidate power or achieve financial
gain, but were carried out under pressure from the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs."8 Allegedly, the Bureau had threatened to reduce the tribe's fed-
eral funding unless the membership rolls were reexamined. 9 In the
interest of fairness and balance, I contacted Tom Diamond, attorney and
spokesman for the Tigua tribe, by phone on February 25, 2000, and asked
him for any comment he or the tribe might have about this issue. Mr.
Diamond replied curtly that the episode was an internal tribal matter and
that he had no comment.
IV. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
It is important to note that there has been no proof that the tribal
council's actions violated its own constitution or the provisions of ICRA.
As a result, there is no basis for the federal government to question the
tribal action taken in Vela's case because the current understanding of
tribal sovereignty prevents federal examination of internal tribal matters.
A federal court did, however, dismiss the tribe's suit against Marty Silvas
for theft of the sacred items on the grounds that the tribe constituted a
sovereign nation.9 ° Furthermore, the Bureau of Indian Affairs refused to






90. See Texas Tribe's Dispute, supra note 59.
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nal tribal matter."'" Tribes are, to a large extent, accountable to no one
but themselves in their decisions on matters affecting the tribe.92
It is difficult for many Americans to understand the power of Ameri-
can Indian tribal sovereignty because many of us are steeped in American
notions of the definition of democracy. According to Robert N. Clinton,
"American law tends to analyze government legitimacy and the relation-
ship between domestic sovereign units in light of a popular sovereignty,
federalist theory developed from jurisprudential roots."'93 In other
words, we think of governmental power as emanating from the people to
the sovereign, and it is by the people's consent that the sovereign rules.
This theory encompasses two important notions. First, federalist the-
ory and the notion of natural law (derived in great part from the work of
John Locke),94 generally viewed consent of the governed through the
constitutional social contract as the fountainhead of governmental legiti-
macy.95 In essence, governmental legitimacy derives from the consent of
the people to be governed. Second, natural law recognizes that sover-
eignty is best exercised when it is divided, rather than held solely by one
person or one body.96 Phrased differently, rather than have the entire
power of the state rest in the hands of a monarch or an autocrat, Ameri-
can-style democracy divides power among a number of bodies, namely,
the federal government and the states. This division is not absolute.
American legal theory also recognizes the benefits of having an ultimate
authority vested with the power to resolve legal conflicts and to enforce
decisions among competing sovereigns within the federal union.97
Indian tribes lie outside this ,natryoshka9 8 framework of sovereigns
within sovereigns. The Indian tribes existed as independent nations
91. Colloff, supra note 1, at 132.
92. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832) (stressing that Indian
tribes are "distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural
rights" in matters of local self-government); United States v. Kagma, 118 U.S. 375 (1886)
(stating that the Indian people are a separate people with the power of regulating their
internal and social relations); Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218, 18 (1897) (holding that the
Indian tribes "have the power to make their own substantive law in internal matters").
93. Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WI.LAm Mrm L Rt-v.
841, 843 (1990) (referring to G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF "niE AmctRICAN Res'tnuc 1776
- 1787, at 453-63, 532-43, 546-47 (1969)).
94. See id. at 844; see also J. LOCKE, OF CIvIL. GOVERNmE, SFnONtO TEatlsn
(Gateway ed., 1955).
95. See Clinton, supra note 93, at 844 (citing to Titit FFI RAUST No. 22, at 146 (Alex-
ander'Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961)).
96. See id.
97. See id. at 845.
98. See RICnARD L. LEED & SLAVO PAPIFRNO, 5000 RUSSIAN WORDS WIng ALL
TnEIR INFLEcTED FORMS AND OrIIER GRAMMATI'A INFORMAlION. A RUSSIAN Dic-
TIONARY WITH AN ENGLISII-RUSSIAN WORD INDEX AND AN Ai'PrpNixx ON RUSSIAN END-
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before the creation of the federal union, and their annexation by the U.S.
government was involuntary.99 Nor did the rulers of Indian tribes look to
European philosophers or Western notions of democracy to justify the
legitimacy of their power; they relied instead on complex systems based
on kinship, religion, or homegrown notions of government, each one
unique to an individual tribe.'00
One of the first cases to address the extent of tribal sovereignty was
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,'0 1 a case involving "a motion on behalf of
the Cherokee Indians... to restrain the state of Georgia... from execut-
ing and enforcing the laws of Georgia... within the Cherokee nation."'0 2
The Cherokee had filed suit against Georgia after the state passed laws
confiscating lands within the state boundaries that were given to the tribe
by the federal government. 10 3 The question of whether the state of Geor-
gia could assert its authority over the Cherokee would be determined
largely by whether the Supreme Court believed that the tribe constituted
"a foreign state in the sense in which that term is used in the
constitution." 0 4
One of the first hurdles any court must clear before hearing a case is
whether or not it has jurisdiction over the matter. Chief Justice Marshall
approached this issue by dividing the question into two distinct issues:
whether the nation was "a foreign state in the sense in which the term is
INGS 101 (1986). A matryoshka, or Russian nesting doll, is a small wooden doll that has
been cut in half widthwise and hollowed out. In the hollow fits a slightly smaller doll,
which is in turn cut in half widthwise and hollowed out to fit another slightly smaller doll,
and so on and so on and so on until two or more dolls fit comfortably within the space
occupied by the largest doll. I feel this metaphor is accurate in describing American fed-
eral democracy: American government is composed of a number of independent sover-
eigns, each supreme in its own sphere, which operates under the umbrella of the sovereign
superior to it. The sovereign is independent as to its own responsibilities and duties, but
relies on the superior sovereign to resolve disputes and perform duties that lie outside the
individual sovereigns' scope of power. Put more bluntly, cities fit into counties fit into
states fit into the federal government; each is supreme in its own space, but cach is also a
component of a superior unit.
99. See Clinton, supra note 93, at 845 (describing the pre-colonial status of the Indian
tribes to contrast with their impending annexation by the federal government).
100. See id. at 847. Clinton reports that "Native Americans were neither citizens nor
subjects of the federal government or any states in which they might reside. They were,
rather, members and citizens of a different nation - their tribe - and were subject to its
governance in all matters of tribal affairs. This relationship bound them into a complex
web of family, clan, religious and society relationships that defined Indian tribal alle-
giance." Id.
101. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
102. Id. at 2.
103. See id. at 15.
104. Id. at 16.
(Vol. 3:71
CURSE OF THE NEW BUFFALO
used in the Constitution"' 5 and whether "the Cherokee constitute a for-
eign state in the sense of the Constitution. "'0 6
The first issue addressed whether the Cherokee nation held the same
sovereign status as Georgia or any other state. Chief Justice Marshall and
a majority of the other justices accepted the argument, stating:
[S]o much of the argument as was intended to prove the character of
the Cherokees as a state, as a distinct political society, separated
from others, capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself,
has, in the opinion of a majority of the judges, been completely suc-
cessful. [The Cherokee] have been uniformly treated as a state from
the settlement of our country... [t]he acts of our government plainly
recognizes [sic] the Cherokee nation as a state, and the courts are
bound by those acts.'0 7
The second issue, whether the Cherokee constituted a foreign state in
relation to the Constitution, reached a different conclusion. While Justice
Marshall stated that the Indians "are acknowledged to have an unques-
tionable, and, heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they oc-
cupy,"'0 8 the status of the Indian nations was not on par with that of the
nations of Britain or France:
[I]t may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within
the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict
accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may, more cor-
rectly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations. They
occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will,
which must take effect in point of possession when their right of pos-
session ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their rela-
tion to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.
They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness
and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the
president as their great father. They and their country are consid-
ered by foreign nations, as well as by ourselves, as being so com-
pletely under the sovereignty and .dominion of the United States,
that any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form a political connec-
tion with them, would be considered by all as an invasion of our ter-





109. Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added).
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The Court ultimately held that since an Indian tribe was not a "foreign
state in the sense of the constitution," it could not maintain its action
before the Supreme Court." 0 For this reason, and because the injunction
sought by the Cherokee would improperly constrain the actions of the
Georgia legislature,11' the motion for injunction was denied. 1 2 Robert
N. Clinton offers another interpretation of the outcome of the case, and
argues that the Indians "were neither citizens nor subjects of the federal
government or any states in which they might reside. . .. They were,
rather, members and citizens of a different nation - their tribe - and were
subject to its governance in all matters of tribal affairs."113
Worcester v. Georgia... was the next major case to address the issue of
the extent of Indian sovereignty. Although the immediate issue involved
a missionary in the Cherokee Nation's territory who had refused to swear
allegiance to the state of Georgia, the case unfolded against a much more
complicated backdrop: the right of states to enforce their laws upon the
territory of Indian nations.115 The petitioner argued that the state of
Georgia could not charge him for violations of Georgia law committed
within the boundaries of the Cherokee nation, since the nation lay
outside Georgia's jurisdiction.' 16
The Court held that even though the lands of the Cherokee were en-
compassed by the state of Georgia, Georgia nevertheless lacked the
power to assert its authority over the Cherokee, and nullified the Georgia
law." 7 The Court did so by recognizing that:
[T]he Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, inde-
pendent political communities, retaining their original natural rights,
as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with
the single exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which ex-
cluded them from intercourse with any other European potentate
than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular region claimed:
The Constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those
to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and
110. Id. at 21.
111. See id. at 19-20.
112. See id. at 20.
113. Clinton, supra note 93, at 847.
114. 31 U. S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
115. See id. at 582-29; see also Perdue, supra note 4, at 108-11. Beginning in 1827, the
Georgia legislature began enacting a series of punitive laws affecting the Indian nations.
See id. Their intent was to make life in the nations so intolerable the Indians would leave
and relocate making land available for white citizens. See id. Despite the ruling in Worces-
ter v. Georgia, the state simply ignored the decision. See id.
116. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 539.
117. See id. at 562-63.
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sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian nations, and conse-
quently admits their rank among those powers who are capable of
making treaties." 8
The Court also looked to the law of nations, which generally recog-
nized a weaker sovereign's right to retain some form of autonomy, even
after associating itself with a stronger sovereign." 9 Justice Marshall con-
cluded by stating that the Cherokee Nation, a distinct community with a
distinct territory, was outside the realm of Georgia law; ultimately, the
relationship between the United States and the Cherokee existed through
federal law. 2
The actions of the state of Georgia in Worcester were representative of
many states' efforts to assert political authority over the tribes by outlaw-
ing tribal government. 12 1 As a result, the tribes sought to protect their
political autonomy and prevent their absorption into non-Indian govern-
ments by signing treaties stating that the affected tribe would never be
included in, or made subject to, the laws of the state or federal terri-
tory.122 Thereafter, many treaties included provisions through which the
federal government extended tribal political hegemony to persons and
property within the tribal boundaries, as exemplified in language con-
tained in a treaty drawn between the federal government and the Choc-
taw tribe of Mississippi:
The Government and people of the United States are hereby obliged
to secure to the said Choctaw Nation of Red People, the jurisdiction
and government of all the persons and property that may be within
their limits west, so that no Territory or State shall ever have a right
to pass laws for the government of the Choctaw Nation of Red Peo-
ple and their descendants; and that no part of the land granted them
shall ever be embraced in any Territory or State; but the U.S. shall
forever secure said Choctaw Nation from, and against, all laws ex-
cept such as from time to time may be enacted in their own National
Councils, not inconsistent with the Constitution, Treaties, and Laws
of the United States; and except as may, and which have been en-
118. Id. at 559.
119. See id. at 560-61. It is possible for a state to subordinate itself to a more powerful
entity for purposes of protection without losing the right to government or state-hood. See
id. at 561.
120. See id. at 561.
121. See Clinton, supra note 93, at 848-49.
122. See id. at 849.
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acted by Congress, to the extent that Congress under the Constitu-
tion are required to exercise a legislation over Indian affairs.1
23
The passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, which granted citi-
zenship to all persons born or naturalized within the United States, was
insufficient to override the prevailing legal history and mutual wishes of
both the federal government and the Indian tribes with regard to sover-
eignty. One of the first post-Fourteenth Amendment cases to address the
nature of tribal sovereignty was Elk v. Wilkins, which involved an Indian
plaintiff whose attempt to register as a voter in the City of Omaha, Ne-
braska was denied.' 24 The plaintiff argued that, because he was born in
the United States, had severed ties to his tribe, and had completely sur-
rendered himself to the jurisdiction of the United States, he was a full
citizen of the United States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment;
thus, he claimed entitlement to the right to vote. 25 The court held that
the Fourteenth Amendment did not make Indians citizens of the United
States, regardless of current tribal membership status.126
While the majority of the Court ruled against the plaintiff, the dissent is
noteworthy because it contains a primordial attempt to narrowly apply
the Fourteenth Amendment to individual Indians.1 27  While Justice
Harlan's dissent hardly constitutes a direct assault upon the notion of In-
dian sovereignty and does not call for a blanket application of the Four-
teenth Amendment to tribal rule, it does seek to impose some limits on
the extent of a tribal sovereignty with regard to individual Indians.)28
Justice Harlan dissented from the majority based largely upon the
wording of the first section of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which states
that the term "citizen" encompasses "all persons born in the United
States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not
taxed."'29 Justice Harlan, with whom Justice Woods concurred, argued
that since the plaintiff had disassociated himself from his tribe, and was
paying taxes to his tribe, the Act of 1866 encompassed the plaintiff and
others similarly placed. 130
123. Id. at 849-50 (quoting Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, Sept. 27, 1830, U.S. &
Choctaw, art. 4, 7 Stat. 333).
124. See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
125. See id. at 94-95.
126. See id. at 109.
127. See id. at 110-23 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
128. See id. at 110-23 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
129. See id. at 110 (Harlan J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion) (emphasis
added).
130. See id. at 114 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan stated that "[tihe entire
debate shows, with singular clearness, indeed, with absolute certainty, that no Senator who
participated in [the passage of the act of 1866], whether in favor or in opposition to the
[Vol. 3:71
CURSE OF THE NEW BUFFALO
Justices Harlan and Woods also directly addressed the Fourteenth
Amendment issue, which in section one' contains no mention of the
"Indians not taxed" exclusionary clause of the Act of 1866.32 Harlan
and Woods concluded, based upon the debates that proceeded the Four-
teenth Amendment's passage, that it was intended to cover persons such
as the plaintiff. The Justices decided that "[a] careful examination ...
justifies us in saying that ... [the Fourteenth Amendment] granted, and
was intended to grant, national citizenship to every... [American Indian]
who was unconnected with any tribe, and who resided . . . outside of
Indian reservations and within one of the States or Territories of the
Union." '33
In 1887, Congress passed the General Allotment Act, a law that re-
flected the then-prevailing trend of tribal assimilation into American soci-
ety and the obliteration of their independent political mechanisms as a
desired goal."' According to Robert N. Clinton, tribal consent to laws
had become merely a formal ritual, 3 ' and the federal government pro-
ceeded to use this and other measures to dissolve tribal political sover-
eignty. In an effort to break down tribal societies, allotment policies
measure, doubted that the bill, as passed, admitted, and was intended to admit, to national
citizenship Indians who abandoned their tribal relations and became residents of one of
the states or Territories, within the full jurisdiction of the United States. It was so inter-
preted by President Johnson, who, in his veto message, said: 'By the first section of the bill
all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding
Indians not taxed, are declared to be citizens of the United States."' (alteration added) Id.
131. See U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV § 1. "All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction, are citizens of the United States and of the States
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
132. See Elk, 112 U.S. at 118 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing how the "Indians not
taxed" statement of the Act of 1866 came to be excluded from the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
133. Id.
134. See General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1988)); see also Clinton, supra note 93, at 852-53. One of the federal
government's goals in the latter half of the nineteenth century regarding Indian treaties
was the assimilation of the Indians "into the economic, social and political fabric of the
American polity by converting them into Thomas Jefferson's image of the backbone of the
American democracy, the yeoman farmer... more importantly, the nomadic way of life of
some of these tribes posed threats to the agricultural land ownership patterns of the en-
croaching Euro-American settlers... these initial treaty provisions not only held out amal-
gamation into American economic life for those tribes that 'voluntarily' submitted, they
also sometimes affirmatively envisioned the dissolution or restructuring of tribal societies
along more individualistic lines." Id.
135. See Clinton, supra note 93, at 853.
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substituted "both different economic ways of life and new political alle-
giances" for traditional components of tribal existence. 136 The results of
which were often less than successful. One measure offered full U.S. citi-
zenship to Indians from nomadic hunter-gatherer tribes, if they were will-
ing to abandon their traditional way of life and adopt a more sedentary,
agrarian existence. 137 The federal government then abandoned all pre-
tense of obtaining tribal acquiescence to laws when it passed the Citizen-
ship Act of 1924.138 This law made all Indians and Alaska natives full
citizens of the United States, regardless of their feelings or desires in the
matter. 139
Tribal sovereignty continues to be a very murky and often contentious
issue today. The position of the tribes (as reflected through their advo-
cacy groups) is one favoring a very expansive and pure view. One such
group, the American Indian Research and Policy Institute (hereinafter
"AIRPI"), has made available online a report that provides "information
that will help tribal leaders focus on and defend the sovereign status of
Indian tribes."'140 The report is an in-depth examination of what the
AIRPI perceives to be the greatest threats to tribal sovereignty.' 4 ' An-
other major Native American advocacy group, the National Congress of
American Indians (hereinafter "NCAI"), likewise advocates a strong, ex-
pansive and inviolable view of tribal sovereignty. Among its resolutions,
the NCAI has supported the absolute authority of tribal governments in
Alaska,142 federal legislation to treat Indian tribes equally with other
136. Id.
137. See id. at 852-53.
138. See Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (1925) (codified as amended 8
U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1988)).
139. See Clinton, supra note 93, at 854.
140. See American Indian Research and Policy Institute, Threats to Tribal Challenge
(last visited at Oct. 3, 2000), at http:l//vww.airpi.org/st98promise.html.
141. See American Indian Research and Policy Institute, Threats to Tribal Sovereignty:
Yesterday's Promise-Today's Challenge, available at http:lwww.airpi.orglst98fund.html
(last visited Oct. 3, 2000). The site indicates that "Idlespite clear sovereignty of Indian
tribes.., the fact remains that Indian people are not just another racial minority group -
they are a people who have retained a unique aboriginal sovereign status." Id.
142. See The National Congress of American Indians Resolution tJUN-00-32, Sup-
port Federal Legislation Calling for Recognition of Hawaiian Nation and Return of Land to
the Hawaiian Nation, available at http://www.ncai.orglNCAIResolutions/Midyr2000/
midyr0032.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2000). The Resolution reads as follows: "WHEREAS,
prior to the arrival of western society Alaska and America's aboriginal inhabitants had
chosen jurisdictions, whose leaderships made laws and rules to govern every person and
aspect of life of that particular community, including but not limited to, determining land
mass, domestic relations, natural resources, punishment for crime, protection of people,
protection of environment, and social structure; and... WHEREAS, nowhere in the past
550 years, or in Alaska's 250 years of contact, nor by any law approved or disapproved or
supported by the aboriginal inhabitants of Alaska, did any Alaska native Government give
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American governments, 43 and federal legislation calling for recognition
of and return of land to the Hawaiian Nation. 1-14
One cannot underestimate the strength and passion that the issue of
sovereignty arouses among American Indians. For instance, the NCIA
web page lists the resolutions it has adopted at its sessions in 1999 and
2000.145 Nearly all of these resolutions begin with a preamble stating
"WHEREAS we, the members of the National Congress of American
Indians of the United States... in order to preserve for ourselves and our
descendents the inherent sovereign rights of our Indian nations, rights se-
cured under Indian treaties and agreements with the United
States .... "146 For many Indians, sovereignty is an emotional as well as
political issue, and is often regarded as an inseparable component of their
identity as Indians.1 47 So powerful is the issue of tribal sovereignty
among Indians that dissent from within is rarely tolerated, and there have
been reprisals in the past against tribal members who have questioned the
status quo.
148
up any right to have exclusive jurisdiction to govern village affairs, sonic of which we noted
above, regardless of their proximity to western society towns, boroughs, municipalities and/
or cities." Id.
143. See The National Congress of American Indians, Resolution 0JUN.00-022,
NCIA Support for Amendment to the Federal Unemployment Tax Act to Treat Indian
Tribes Equally with Other Governments, adopted June 25-28, 2000 at http'/lwvw.ncai.org/
NCAIResolutions/Midyr2000/midyrOO022.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2000). The Resolution
reads as follows: "NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that NCAI supports
NIGA's [the National Indian Gaming Association] continued advocacy seeking to amend
FUTA [the Federal Unemployment Tax Act] to treat Indian tribes on an equal basis with
other governments within the United States and will assist NIGA's staff to the extent that
NCAI has resourced available, and further desires that NIGA's efforts in this regard be
seen as the joint efforts of NCAI and NIGA." Id.
144. See Resolution #JUN-00-032, supra note 141.
145. See id.
146. See id. (emphasis added).
147. See Richard A. Monette, Sovereignty and Survival: The Status of Indian Trtbes
Under American Law is a Key to Their Culhural Eristence, 84 A.B.A. J. 64, 64 (2000)
(describing the experience a young Anishinabe attorney had when he sought to gain a
better understanding of what tribal sovereignty was. "Upon retreating to his tribe's terri-
tory - his 'reservation' - lie shared with elders [his desire to understand what tribal sover-
eignty was]; a grandfather arose, drew a line in the sand and, pointing to one side of the
line and then the other, declared, '[t]hat's the state of North Dakota, and this is Indian
country. And that's sovereignty.' A grandmother arose, pressed the nails of both hands
against her chest, and said simply, 'Itihis is sovereignty.').
148. See Sean Paige, Gambling on the Future, INslarr ON riTm News, Dec. 22, 1997. at
8. One such experience is exemplified by Bill Lawrence, a member of the Red Lake band
of Chippaws of Minnesota and the publisher of the Native American PressiOjibwc News.
See id. Lawrence ran investigative stories on corruption among Indian officials that re-
sulted in the criminal convictions of eight state tribal leaders. See id. As a result, Paige's
newspaper was boycotted by tribal casinos, his wife was fired from her teaching job at a
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It is worth noting that while the Supreme Court has already held that
Indian tribes are not directly analogous to nations in the international
sense,14 9 many Indian tribes and their advocacy groups adhere to a vision
of sovereignty similar to that enjoyed by foreign states. 5 ' While this
view persists, the concept of sovereignty among the world's nations is un-
dergoing a radical metamorphosis; indeed, recent events suggest that the
world is shifting away from the notion of sovereignty as completely
absolute.
In the context of relations among foreign states, immunity from "legis-
lative, judicial and enforcement jurisdiction"'' has been extended to dip-
lomats 152 and heads of state.1 53 A symbiotic component of the head-of-
state immunity was the act of state doctrine, which is based upon the
tribal school, and he was subject to personal derision and referred to as an "Indian Uncle
Tom." See id. Paige quotes Lawrence as saying, "the biggest abusers and exploiters of
Indians are other Indian people." Id. Lawrence goes on to say that "reservations won't
become more democratic or accountable until they no longer can hide behide claims of
absolute sovereignty... You have to pierce the veil; they can't have this absolute control,"
Lawrence says of tribal leaders. Id. "They've been hiding their criminal conduct behind it
for years." Id.
149. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17-18.
150. See Monette, supra note 147. The prevailing feeling among Indian tribes regard-
ing the extent of sovereignty is that sovereignty represents both territory and peoples. See
id. This lesson reflects the prevailing notion of sovereignty in the world today. See id. On
the international plane, sovereignty inures to the state, the basic socio-political entity, with
a relatively well-defined territory and peoples whose cultural markers distinguish them
from others as a nation. See id. The actual state of sovereignty also requires that the
integrity of both the territory and the peoples be recognized and respected by other sover-
eigns. See id. Thus, tribal sovereignty is no different from the sovereignty of any other
state, nation or peoples. See id. Natives view their tribal sovereignty much the same as any
American views the sovereignty of the union and its respective states. See id. See also
American Indian Research and Policy Institute, supra note 139. "yeaties were agreements
between sovereign nations that granted special peace, alliance, trade and land rights to the
newcomers. Indian governments used treaties to confirm and retain rights such as the
sovereign right of self-government, fishing and hunting rights and jurisdictional rights over
their lands ... Treaties did not, as is commonly assumed, grant rights to the Indians from
the United States. Tribes ceded certain rights to the United States government and re-
served rights they never gave away." Id.
151. Michael P. Davis, Note, Accountability And World Leadership: Impugning Sover-
eign Immunity, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 1357, 1362 (2000) (citing Louis HENKIN E-1 AL., IN-
"rERNA rIONAL LAw CASES AND MArERIALS 1126 (3d ed. 1993)).
152. See id. at 1362-63 (citing Wilson v. Blanco, 4 N.Y.S. 714, 714 (1889) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted) (stating that "[tihe more recent theory of extraterritoriality 'de-
rives support from the legal fiction that an ambassador is not an inhabitant of the country
to which he is accredited but of the country of his origin and the sovereign he represents,
and within whose territory he always resides"').
153. See id. at 1363 (identifying head-of-state immunity as a customary international
law principle by which "each state protects the immunity concept so that its own head-of-
state will be protected when he or she is abroad"); see also Shobha Varughese George,
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principle that "[elvery sovereign state is bound to respect the indepen-
dence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within
its own territory."' 54 While the act of state doctrine remains largely undi-
luted today,'55 the immunity given to a state or its leaders is no longer
absolute.
For example, on October 16, 1998, former Chilean dictator Augosto
Pinochet was arrested by British authorities while undergoing medical
treatment in London.1 56 The arrest was based upon a Spanish warrant
seeking extradition of Pinochet to Spain to face charges of murder, tor-
ture and genocide during his 17-year rule of Chile.' 57 The Chilean gov-
ernment and Pinochet's lawyers objected strenuously to Pinochet's arrest,
asserting violations of Chile's national sovereignty' 58 and Pinochet's im-
munity as a head of state. 59 Twice the British courts overruled Pi-
nochet's objections, and held that Pinochet could be extradited to
Spain.160 The basis for Spain's extradition request' 6 ' and the principal
reasoning for the British court's extradition was the concept of "universal
jurisdiction," 162 which has gained greater acceptance and recognition in
recent years.1 63
Note, Head-of-State Ininzunily in the United States Courts: Still Confused After All These
Years, 64 FORDHAM L. RFv. 1051, 1055 (1995).
154. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
155. See Davis, supra note 151, at 1364 (citing to R rusr' .imNrr (Taitt3) OF 7wil FoR.
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TtE UNITED STATES § 443(I) (1987)). "In the absence of a treaty
or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, courts in the
United States will generally refrain from... sitting in judgment on... acts of a governmen-
tal character done by a foreign state within its own territory and applicable there." id.
156. See Several Bids Are Begun to Aid Pinochet; Chilean President, lawyers Seek
Release, CHi. TRI., Oct. 23, 1998, at N24 (stating when General Pinochct was arrested in
Britain).
157. See id.
158. See Bringing Pinochet to Justice; International and Political Factors That May
Impact the UK's Efforts to Try Former Chilean Dictator Augosto Pinochet for Crimes
Against Humanity, THE CHRISTIAN CN-rTURY, Dec. 23, 1998, at 1237 (describing the claims
of the state of Chile and Pinochet as to why the former dictator was immune from extradi-
tion and trial in Spain).
159. See id.
160. See Davis, supra note 151, at 1361.
161. See id. at 1368-70.
162. See id. 1368.
163. See id. at 1368-69 (quoting Jeffrey Rabkin, Note, Universal Justice: The Role of
the Federal Courts iz International Civil Litigation, 95 Coiumi. L RL-v. 2120. 2139 (1995)).
The source asserts that "[tlhe doctrine of universal jurisdiction provides that claims arising
from universally condemned conduct are within the subject matter jurisdiction of all
courts, regardless of the location or nationality of the parties." Id. The doctrine was first
developed to justify the assertion of jurisdiction over pirates who, by definition, were
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The purpose of the preceding discussion was not to delve into an exten-
sive in-depth discussion of the nature of international law, nor was it
meant to suggest that whatever acts Indian tribes commit under cloak of
their sovereignty is in any way commensurate with the misdeeds of the
Pinochet regime or crimes against humanity in general. Rather, the pur-
pose was to illustrate that sovereignty has, at least on the international
level, surrendered some of its absolute nature.
Despite Congress' blanket grant of United States citizenship to its na-
tive people, the government has not fully resolved the issue of whether
the Constitution is wholly applicable to the internal relations of Indian
tribes. However, such a determination has been clarified, somewhat, by
the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act.
V: THE INDIAN CIVIL RiG'-rrs ACT' 16
4
Why is there a need for a separate Bill of Rights for Indians? After all,
if the U.S. Constitution provides protection to all Americans, then surely
the first Americans are covered under its umbrella. However, such a sim-
ple analysis fails when one realizes that the structures of federal, state and
municipal governments of this country, and those of the Indian tribe, are
not directly analogous to one another.
The Indian Civil Rights Act was created with the assumption that "ab-
sent imposition by statute, even fundamental guarantees of the Constitu-
tion [did] not protect Indians in relations with their tribes, and that
Congress should cure by statute the lack of Indian civil rights under the
Constitution." '165 ICRA had its roots in a rider to House Resolution
2516, which "was originally aimed at expanding protections" established
by federal civil rights legislation.' 66 Congressional debate regarding the
passage of an Indian Bill of Rights arose in the 1960s, a time when much
attention in Congress and the nation as a whole was focused on the ex-
pansion and protection of civil rights for minorities.
Lawmakers acknowledged early on the dissimilarity between tribal
councils and non-Indian governing bodies. 67 Colorado Reprcsentative
Wayne N. Aspinall, in debating a provision of H.R. 2516, a matter regard-
outside the territorial jurisdiction of any particular country but were, at the same time, a
burden on all nations. See id. at 2140. The doctrine of Universal Jurisdiction has also been
recognized by American Courts in regards to acts such as official torture and genocide. See
Demjanjuk v. Petovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582-83 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that genocide is a
'universal tort' that can be claimed in any nation's courts).
164. 25 U.S.C.A. ch.15 §§ 1301-1303 (West Supp. 2000).
165. J. Kenneth Reiblich, Indian Rights Under the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 10 ARuz.
L. REV. 617, 621 (1968).
166. Id. at 617 (emphasis added).
167. See id. at 618.
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ing the appointment of counsel to Indian defendants in criminal matters
before a tribal court, noted that:
One provision of title II [of H.R. 2516] provides that in an Indian
tribal court a defendant in a criminal case shall be entitled to the
assistance of counsel. In an ordinary court of law this would, of
course, be a highly desirable provision. A tribal court, however, is not
an ordinary court. Neither the judges nor the prosecutors are attor-
neys. They function in a most informal matter. The fear expressed,
which I believe should be evaluated, is that a defense lawyer in that
kind of court would so confuse the lay judges with formalistic de-
mands that the system might collapse.' 6
There were other differences that made the direct application of consti-
tutional restrictions to the tribes unpalatable to many lawmakers, Indian
and non-Indian alike. The reasons for this differentiation stems from the
very origins of the Indians' relationship with the federal American gov-
ernment. In its purest form, this relationship comports with the ages-old
conflict between the conqueror and the conquered. In short, the "Ameri-
can Indians .. .have been asked (or compelled) to surrender a simple
free existence under tribal or family government on land they were free
to roam at will, for a way of life which they have never sought, nor ac-
cepted, as better than their own."' 69
The original text of Title II, as first proposed in Senate Bill 961, stated
"any Indian tribe in exercising its powers of local government shall, with
certain exceptions, be subject to the same limitations and restraints as
those which are imposed on the government of the United States by the
Constitution." 't °7 The wording of Senate Bill 961 came under criticism
because its wording and sweeping coverage failed to acknowledge "the
Indians' economic and social condition, his customs, his beliefs, and his
attitudes." '171 Frank J. Berry, Solicitor of the Department of the Interior,
summarized one main reason for the failure to establish a nexus between
"American federal law and tribal law":
[T]he Constitution of the United States was adopted by a people
whose philosophical and political roots were deeply embedded in the
history of England and of Western Europe. Many of the restrains
and limitations on the United States contained in the U.S. Constitu-
168. Id. (emphasis added).
169. Id. at 619 (citizg Burton D. Fretz, The Bill of Rights and the American Indian
Tribal Governments, 6 NArURAL RESOURCES 1. 581, 586-87 (1966)).
170. Id. at 621, n.14 (quoting Hearings on S. 961-68 and SJ. Res. 40 Before the Sub-
comm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1965)).
171. Id. at 622.
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tion were an outgrowth of that history. On the other hand, the peo-
ple of Indian tribes have their roots in an entirely different culture
and it may be that the devices which appropriately protected the in-
terests of the Anglo-American of the late 1 8th century, may not be
appropriate to protect the Indian tribal member of the middle 2 0 
1h
century. 172
Much of the rest of ICRA was thus drafted with awareness of, and
sensitivity to, these differences. For example, Paragraph 1 of Title 1I is
essentially a carbon copy of the first amendment; however, it excludes the
prohibition against the establishment of a religion. 73 This exclusion is an
acknowledgement of the fact that many Indian tribes are theocratic in
nature.
174
In its modern form, ICRA is codified in Title 25 of the U.S.C.A. 7 5
Section 1302 of 25 U.S.C.A. contains ten constitutional restrictions by
which tribal governments must abide in their dealings with individual tri-
bal members. 76 Generally, these restrictions read like the Bill of Rights;
however, alterations reflect the understanding that the federal and state
governments are not analogous to an Indian tribe.
Subsection One of § 1302 is a modified duplicate of the First Amend-
ment, granting almost all the latter's rights, with the notable exception of
the interference with the establishment of a religion. 7 7 Subsection "Wo
is essentially a direct facsimile of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on
search and seizures without a warrant issued for just cause.' 78
Subsections Three, Four and Five are separate provisions, which en-
compass some of the guarantees provided by the Fifth Amendment. Sub-
section Three contains the Fifth Amendment's double-jeopardy
prohibition.'79 Subsection Four contains the prohibition against self-in-
crimination. 80 Subsection Five prevents the tribe from taking an individ-
ual's property for public use without just compensation. 8 '
Subsections Six through Ten are primarily, though not exclusively, re-
lated to criminal matters. Subsection Six is a modified version of the
Sixth Amendment and contains the guarantee of a trial in criminal cases,
172. Id. (citing Hearings on S. 961-68 and J.J. Res. 40 Before the Subcomm. on Con-
stitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1966)).
173. See id. at 623.
174. See id.
175. See 25 U.S.C.A. ch.15 (West Supp. 2000).
176. See id. § 1302 (1-10).
177. Compare 25 U.S.C.A. § 1302(1) (West Supp. 2000) with U.S. CONST. amend 1.
178. Compare 25 U.S.C.A. § 1302(2) (West Supp. 2000) with U.S. Cows'r. amend. IV.
179. Compare 25 U.S.C.S. § 1302(3) (West Supp. 2000) with U.S. CowsT. amend. V.
180. Compare 25 U.S.C.A. § 1302(4) (West Supp 2000) with U.S. CoNs-. amend. V.
181. Compare 25 U.S.C.A. § 1302(5) (West Supp. 2000) with U.S. CONSTr. amend. V.
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but leaves out three exceptions. 82 First, it does not contain the guaran-
tee that a jury be composed of impartial jurors."a Second, it does not
contain the guarantee that the crime shall be tried in the state and district
in which it occurred.' 84 Third, while Subsection Six entitles a defendant
to counsel for his defense, the defendant, and not the tribe, is required to
pay for defense counsel.' 85
Subsection Seven contains the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of ex-
cessive bail and cruel and unusual punishment, as well as a maximum
sentence that a tribe can impose."8 6 Subsection Eight is a concentrated
version of the Fourteenth Amendment and only guarantees that a tribe
shall not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due pro-
cess of law." '18 7 Subsection Nine prohibits a tribe from passing any bill of
attainder or ex post facto law,"m and Subsection Ten prohibits the tribe
from denying to any person accused of an offense punishable by impris-
onment the right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six
persons.1 89
Since its inception, ICRA has sought to maintain the precarious bal-
ance between respecting the rights of individual Indians and respecting
the historical sovereignty enjoyed by tribes. 190 This struggle has become
more challenging with the passage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.
VI. THE INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY Ac-r
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) 19 ' was enacted by Con-
gress in 1988, following more than a decade of controversy between tribes
and states over the ability of states to constrain on-reservation economic
enterprises. 92 Controversy originated in the 1970s, as tribes sold tax ex-
empt tobacco products on the reservation, which gave them a competitive




186. See 25 U.S.C.S. § 1302(7) (West Supp. 2000). A tribal court cannot impose con-
viction for any one offense, any penalty, or punishment greater than imprisonment for a
term of one year and a fine of $5,000, or both. See id.
187. Compare 25 U.S.C.A. § 1302(8) (West Supp. 2000) with U.S. CONSI. amend.
XIV.
188. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 1302(9) (Vest Supp. 2000).
189. See id. § 1302(10).
190. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 62. Two competing purposes inherent the provi-
sions of ICRA are the goals of strengthening the tribe and its individual tribal members
and promoting the federal policy of advancing Indian self-government. See hiL
191. 25 U.S.C.A. § 2701 (West Supp. 2000).
192. See Henderson, supra note 13.
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advantage over non-Indian tobacco retailers. 193 In 1980, the U. S. Su-
preme Court's ruling in Washington v. Confederated Colville Tribes'" re-
sulted in the states' ability to collect taxes on these products.' 95 As a
result, many Indian tribes turned to bingo as a source of revenue.' 96 This
change to gaming revenue set the stage for a greater conflict with the
states, particularly those states with public policies against gambling.
This new controversy was first addressed by the Supreme Court in Cali-
fornia v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.'97 In Cabazon, two Califor-
nia Indian tribes were authorized by ordinance to operate bingo, draw
poker, and other games on their respective reservations.' 98 Their gaming
operations were open to the public and drew a majority of non-Indian
gamblers.' 99 Conflict arose when California attempted to apply state law
to the tribes' gaming operations.2 °0 Successful application of the Califor-
nia statute had drastically curtailed the amount of jackpots offered and
strictly dictated the use of gaming profits .20  California claimed that the
tribes violated state statutes regulating bingo operations and sued the
tribes to force compliance with state law. 02
Unlike its previous decision in Confederated Colville Tribes, the Su-
preme Court ruled in favor of the California tribes and held that state
regulation of a tribe's bingo enterprise would impermissibly interfere
with tribal government. 20 3 The court based its ruling on the recognition
of tribal sovereignty "over both their members and their territory,"
20
"
and that "tribal sovereignty is dependent on, and subordinate to, only the
federal government, not the States. '20 5 However, the Court also pro-
vided that "state laws may be applied to tribal Indians on their reserva-
tions if Congress has expressly so provided., 216  The Court further
193. See id. at 11.
194. 447 U.S. 134, 151 (1980).
195. See id. at 155. The Court noted that principles of federal Indian law do not give
tribes the right to provide a tax exemption to persons who would otherwise not be exempt
elsewhere and held that the state could collect taxes from non-Indian cigarette purchasers
on reservations because the burden on the reservation merchant ill collecting the tax was
"minimal. See id.
196. See Henderson, supra note 13, at 11.
197. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
198. See id. at 204-05.
199. See id. at 205.
200. See id. Specifically, California attempted to apply the California Penal Code to
the bingo games.
201. See id. at 204-05.
202. See id.
203. See id. at 220.
204. Id. at 207 (citing U.S. v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)).
205. Id. (citing Washington, 447 U.S. at 154).
206. Id.
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concluded that because the state of California did not have a general pro-
hibition against gambling within its boundaries,2" 7 and since the economic
development represented by gaming enterprises was an integral compo-
nent of tribal self-determination,2 8 "state regulation would impermissi-
bly infringe on tribal government., 219
As a result of Cabazon, many states expressed concern over the poten-
tial ramifications of the Court's decision and appealed to Congress for
some element of control over the matter.21 IGRA was born in 1988 as a
direct response to these concerns."' While IGRA did have as a policy
objective the promotion of tribal economic development as a means to
strengthen tribal government and attain economic self-sufficiency, it also
placed restrictions on the extent of tribal sovereignty. 212
IGRA divides gaming on Indian reservations into three classes. Class I
gaming falls within the tribe's exclusive jurisdiction2 3 and consists of "so-
cial games for prizes of minimal value., 214 The category of Class II gam-
ing encompasses many of the primary income generators in tribal casinos,
which includes bingo and certain types of card games.2 15 Class III gaming
is the residual catch-all category which encompasses any form of gam-
bling that does not fit into the definitions of Class I or II;216 Class III
gaming is usually equated with casino gaming.217
IGRA limits Indian sovereignty by dictating that revenue generated by
Class II gaming can only be used for five purposes: "to fund tribal gov-
ernment operations or programs; to provide for the general welfare of the
Indian tribe and its members; to promote tribal economic development;
to donate to charitable organizations; or to help fund operations of local
government agencies." 218 One way tribes can "provide for the general
welfare of the Indian tribe and its members" is to make regular disburse-
ments of the casino revenues to registered members of the tribe.2 19
207. See id. at 211.
208. See id. at 219. See also Henderson, supra note 13, at 11.
209. Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 222.
210. See Henderson, supra note 13, at 11.
211. 25 U.S.C.S. § 2702 (Law. Co-Op. 1995). See also Henderson, supra note 13, at
11.
212. See Henderson, supra note 13, at 11.
213. See 25 U.S.C.S. § 2710(a)(1) (Law. Co-Op. 1995).
214. Id. § 2703(6). See also Henderson. supra note 13, at 11.
215. See 25 U.S.C.S. § 2703(7)(A)(i)(ii) (Law. Co-op. 1995): see also Henderson,
supra note 13, at 11.
216. See 25 U.S.C.S. § 2703(8) (Law. Co-op. 1995).
217. See Henderson, supra note 13, at 12.
218. 25 U.S.C.S. § 2710(b)(2)(B) (Law. Co-op. 1995).
219. Id. § 2710(b)(3).
2000]
THE SCHOLAR
Therefore, IGRA has created a new source of income for individual
tribal members; income that stands as great incentive for seeking recogni-
tion of membership in a tribe that participates in gaming enterprises. It is
therefore axiomatic that those who wield the authority to recognize who
is and who is not a tribal member hold considerable power over the eco-
nomic well-being of "questionable" tribal members. In light of this con-
clusion, the next issue to address is the extent of a tribe's right to
determine its membership without interference or oversight from either
the federal or state governments.
VII. TRIBAL MEMBERSHIP
Although the right to determine tribal membership is unquestionably
within the purview of the tribe,220 the determination of who may claim
membership in a tribe today rests largely upon the issue of lineage. In
more mechanical terms, legitimacy as a tribal member is determined by
how much "Indian blood" one happens to possess. 221 If an individual
carries enough blood to meet a standard set by either the tribe or the
federal government, then that person is a member and entitled to all the
benefits concomitant with tribal membership. 222
220. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 55 (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515, 559, 8 L. Ed. 483 (1832)). The Worcester Court held that "Indian tribes are
'distinct independent political communities retaining their original natural rights' in mat-
ters of local self-government." Id. See also Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218, 222 (1897). The
Court held that "the only restriction on the power of the Chickasaw Nation to legislate in
respect to its internal affairs is that such legislation shall not conflict with the Constitution
or laws of the United States, and we know of no provision of such Constitution or laws
which would be set at naught by the action of a political community like this in withdraw-
ing privileges of membership in the community once conferred." Id.
221. See Pickier, supra note 67. Most tribal constitutions require a certain blood
quantum - or proportion of Indian lineage - for membership. See id. See also Siegel,
supra note 67. Siegel summarizes Scott L. Peeler, a researcher of Indian genealogy:
"Tribes set membership requirements. Being listed as Indian on a census or birth certifi-
cate is not enough. [The tribes] want proof that you are a direct descendent of someone on
their membership rolls.... Most also stipulate a 'blood quantum.' The majority [of tribes]
require that your ancestry be at least a quarter tribal ... " I.
222. See Mark Neath, American Indian Gaming Enterprises and Tribal Membership:
Race, Exclusivity, and a Perilous Future, 2 U. Cm. L. Scm. ROUNDTAM.ul 689, 694 (1995).
As semi-sovereign nations, "Indian tribes have the authority to define their own citizenship
requirements, although Congress may define the term Indian for purposes of federal rec-
ognition. Gaming success, however, has led tribes to favor a restrictive, race-based concep-
tion'of tribal citizenship. Typical is the Revised Constitution of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
which limits future tribal enrollment to 'persons of three-eights or more Jicarilla Apache
Indian blood ... whose mother or father is a member of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe.' Blood
quantum tests act as a simple means of constraining population growth, thereby restricting
the available pool of gaming revenue to existing tribal members." Id.
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It is important to keep in mind that the current methods of determining
membership status in a tribe are not creations of the tribes themselves,
but are a creation of the federal government of the United States. '  In
her article, Judith Resnik comments on the current federally-imposed no-
tion of tribal membership. She states that membership was a concept
imposed upon the Indians by the federal government for a number of
reasons; today, membership is restrictive in nature due to the limited pool
of resources the federal government offers to those who are members of
tribes.224
The membership scheme today is very heavily regulated and codified.
Today, tribes generally use one or more of the following to determine
membership: (1) blood quantum, (2) descendancy, (3) patrilineage, or (4)
matrilineage. 22 This determination along racial lines is significant be-
cause it is the "yardstick" by which the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA"),
the federal agency largely responsible for determining Indian policy, de-
cides who receives benefits reserved for Indians. For example, BIA oper-
ates under an eligibility policy which limits its service population to
Indian people who: 1) have over one quarter or more Indian blood; 2) are
223. See Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: hndian Tribes, States, and the Federal
Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 719 (1989).
224. See id. at 719-20. See also 25 U.S.C. § 450b(a) (1982) (designating beneficiaries of
Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act as including any 'member of an
Indian tribe."'); Shoeshone Tribes v. United States, 299 U.S. 476 (1937); Robert N. Clinton,
Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze. 18
ARIZ. L. REV. 503, 513-20 (1976).
225. See Kathryn R. L. Rand and Steven A. Light, Virtue or tice: flow IGRA Shapes
the Politics of Native American Gaming, Sovereignty and ldentit, 4 VA. J. So(-. Pot "C & L
381, 412 (1997); see also Sharon O'Brien, The Concept of Sovereignty: The Key to Indian
Social Justice, in AMERICAN INDIANS: SOCIAl. JusTIcE AND PUBLIC POLICY (Donald E.
Green & Thomas V. Tonnesen, eds. 1966); Nora Livesay, Understanding the History of
Tribal Enrollment, American Indian Research and Policy Institute, available at hItp'/
www.airpi.orglenroll.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2000). "Blood quantum" is simply the per-
centage of Indian blood an individual has. See id. For instance, a person born to a full-
blooded Apache Indian man and a European woman would have a blood quantum of fifty
percent Apache. See id. In her article, Lovesay describes the basic mechanics of the blood
quantum: "In 1887, under the General Allotment Act (also known as the Dawes Act),
Congress adopted the blood quantum standard of one-half or more Indian blood. This
meant that if an Indian could document that he (women were excluded) Ihadi one-half or
more Indian blood, then he could receive 160 acres of tribal land. All other Indians were
excluded regardless of their standing within the tribe." hi. See also JosFlmi' B. Ac-tvi-s &
H. GILL KING, INTRODUCTION TO ANTiROI'OLOGY 342 (1979). The author defines pa-
trilined descent as "[the individual] is related to men and women by descent from a com-
mon ancestor by means of a series of male links, i.e., the ancestor's son, his son's son, and
so on," and matrilineal descent as "[the individual] is related to men and women by de-
scent from a common ancestress by means of a series of female links." Id.
2000]
THE SCHOLAR
members of federally recognized tribes; and 3) live on or near an Indian
reservation.226
The right of the tribe to set its own criteria for membership within the
tribe was established in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.227 The dispute in
Santa Clara arose when the respondents, two members of the Santa Clara
Pueblo tribe, brought suit against the tribe and its governor to enjoin
them from enforcing a tribal law. 28 The law denied tribal membership to
children born to member mothers who married outside the tribe. 29 In
contrast, however, the same law allowed membership to children of malc
members who likewise married outside the tribe.230 In Santa Clara, the
respondent had wed a man from the Navajo Tribe. 31
Due to the tribal law, the woman's daughter, because of her Navajo
husband, was denied admission into the Santa Clara Pueblo tribe.2 32 The
respondent argued that the tribal ordinance violated Title I of the Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968,33 namely, the provision which reads that "no
Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws" or deprive
any person of liberty or property without due process of law.234 The re-
spondent asserted that the tribal law discriminated on the basis of sex and
ancestry in violation of the Act.2 35 The petitioner tribe argued that the
court in which the case was originally filed, the United States District
Court for the District of New Mexico, lacked jurisdiction to try "intra-
tribal controversies affecting matters of tribal self-government and sover-
eignty." '36 The tribe also argued that while ICRA does modify the
substantial law applicable to the tribe, "Congress did not intend to au-
thorize federal courts to review violations of its provisions except as they
might arise on habeus corpus., 2 37
While the district court dismissed the jurisdictional claim, it did find in
favor of the tribe on the merits, holding that the Santa Clarans had tradi-
226. See Rand and Light, supra note 224, at 413; see also Tiguas Cut from Tribe Face
Hardship, supra note 65. The Tiguas are one of the few tribes in the United States that
does not control its blood quantum determination by themselves; instead, they had theirs
required quantum by an act of Congress in 1988 at one-eighth native blood. See id.




231. See id. at 52.
232. See id.
233. See id. at 51.
234. See id. (quoting the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1968)).
235. See id. at 51 (citing to 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1968)).
236. Id. at 53.
237. Id. at 58.
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tionally passed on membership in the tribe through patrilineal links, and
that such a seemingly-discriminatory mechanism was "basic to the tribe's
survival as a cultural and economic entity."" 8 In finding for the tribe, the
district court concluded that, in the balance struck between the compet-
ing interests of the respondent and the tribe, the determination of that
balance was best left to the Pueblo:
[T]he equal protection guarantee of the Indian Civil Rights Act
should not be construed in a manner which would require or author-
ize this Court to determine which traditional values will promote cul-
tural survival and should therefore be preserved. .... Such a
determination should be made by the people of Santa Clara; not only
because they can best decide what values are important, but also be-
cause they must live with the decision every day .... To abrogate
tribal decisions, particularly in the delicate area of membership, for
whatever 'good' reasons, is to destroy cultural identity under the
guise of saving it.239
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of the tribe for a number of
reasons. However, the primary basis for its ruling rested upon the long
held notions of what sovereignty entailed: First, "Indian tribes have long
been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from suit tradi-
tionally enjoyed by sovereign powers. ' 240 Second, "[t]his aspect of tribal
sovereignty, like all others, is subject to the superior and plenary control
of Congress. But 'without congressional authorization,' the 'Indian Na-
tions are exempt from suit."' 24 Third, "a waiver of sovereign immunity
'cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.' 
-2,42 In essence,
Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing the common-law
immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers and "with-
out Congressional authorization, the Indian nations are exempt from
suit." '2 43 The court summarized its conclusions:
[Als we have repeatedly emphasized, Congress' authority over In-
dian matters is extraordinarily broad, and the role of courts in adjust-
ing relations between and among tribes and their members [is]
238. Id. at 54.
239. Id. at 54 (alterations in original) (quoting Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402
F.Supp. 5, 18-19 (D. N.M. 1975)).
240. Id. at 58 (citing Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358 (1919); United States v.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506,512-513 (1940); Puyallup Tribe. Inc. v.
Washington Dept. of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 172-173 (1977)).
241. Id. at 58 (quoting United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512
(1940)).
242. Id. (citing United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976). quoting United




correspondingly restrained.. ..Congress retains authority expressly to
authorize civil actions for injunctive or other relief to redress viola-
tions of § 1302, in the event that the tribes themselves prove defi-
cient in applying and enforcing its substantive provisions but unless
and until Congress makes clear its intention to permit the additional
intrusion on tribal sovereignty that adjudication of such actions in a
federal forum would represent, we are constrained to find that
§ 1302 does not impliedly authorize actions for declaratory or injunc-
tive relief against either the tribe or its officers.24 4
The Santa Clara ruling was hailed as a victory for tribal sovereignty;
however, the dissent, delivered by Justice Jackson and White, used the
testimony of witnesses before a Senate Subcommittee regarding depriva-
tions of their rights by tribal governments to castigate the majority for
failing to take these considerations into account. Witness testimony pro-
vides ominous foreshadowing of a future filled with Tigua-like episodes in
which the tribe is accountable to no one but itself:
[S]everal witnesses appearing before the Senate Subcommittee testi-
fied concerning deprivations of their rights by tribal authorities and
their inability to gain relief. Mr. Frank Takes Gun, President of the
Native American Church, for example, stated that 'the Indian is
without an effective means to enforce whatever constitutional rights
he may have in tribal proceedings instituted to deprive him of liberty
or property. While I suppose abstractedly [sic] we might be said to
enjoy [certain] rights... the blunt fact is that unless the tribal court
elects to confer that right upon us we have no way of securing it." '245
Further testimony at the same subcommittee hearings raised the spec-
ter that personal conflicts and favoritism between tribal rulers and mem-
bers could lead to substantial rights violations:
Miss Emily Schuler, who accompanied a former Governor of the Is-
leta Pueblo to the hearings... complained that '[t]he people get gov-
ernors and sometimes they get power hungry and then the people
have no rights at all,' to which Senator Ervin responded, 'Power hun-
gry is a pretty good shorthand statement to show why the people of
the United States drew up a Constitution. They wanted to compel
their rulers to stay within the bounds of that Constitution and not let
that hunger for power carry them outside it.' 246
244. Id. at 72.
245. Id. at 81.
246. Id. at 82.
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Justice White states in his dissent that the court, "by denying a federal
forum to Indians who allege that their rights under the ICRA have been
denied by their tribes, substantially undermines a goal of the ICRA and
in particular frustrates Title I's purpose of 'protecting individual Indians
from arbitrary and unjust actions of tribal governments.24
Justice White saw some glimmer of hope through the examination of
Bell v. Hood,248 in which the Court noted that "where federally protected
rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that
courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary
relief."24 9 Justice White also stated "the fact that a statute is merely de-
clarative and does not expressly provide for a cause of action to enforce
its terms 'does not, of course, prevent a federal court from fashioning an
effective equitable remedy."'" Therefore, the Court can adjust the rules
to prevent injustice.
Justice White concludes by calling attention to the real potential for
abuse that exists among unaccountable tribes:
In the case of the Santa Clara Pueblo... both legislative and judicial
powers are vested in the same body, the Pueblo Council... to sug-
gest that this tribal body is the "appropriate" forum for the adjudica-
tion of alleged violations of the ICRA is to ignore both reality and
Congress' desire to provide a means of redress to Indians aggrieved
by their tribal leaders.25
If the majority opinion's view in Santa Clara is accepted, the reasons
for drafting ICRA seem to have been defeated (assuming, as intimated
by Justice White's dissent, that ICRA exists as a means to provide indi-
vidual tribal members with redress and due process in disputes with their
tribal governments). Santa Clara does not stand for the proposition that
Indian sovereignty places all internal decisions of the tribe outside of the
purview of federal scrutiny. For instance, the court relied on an earlier
case, Talton v. Mayes,252 to support the proposition that Congress has
plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local self-
government, which the tribes otherwise possess. 3 Title I of ICRA rep-
resents an exercise of that plenary authority by imposing certain restric-
247. Id. at 73.
248. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
249. Id. at 684.
250. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 73 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 414 n.13 (1968)).
251. Id. at 82 (White, J., dissenting).
252. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
253. See id. at 384.
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tions upon tribal governments similar, but not identical, to those found in
the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.254
Two cases have called the Santa Clara ruling into doubt; yet, their disa-
greement falls short of fully challenging the Supreme Court's authority.
Davids v. Coyhids,255 decided in 1994, involved members of the Stock-
bridge-Munsee Community Band of Mohican Indians who filed suit
against members of their tribal council, claiming IGRA violations.256
While the court essentially held that tribal sovereign immunity barred the
suit and reaffirmed historical recognition of the existence and extent of
sovereign immunity, 7 it also noted an earlier Supreme Court case,
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe,2 58 in
which the Court extended jurisdiction to actions seeking equitable
relief.259
Both Davids and Oklahoma Tax Comm'n left Santa Clara intact; how-
ever, their challenge to Santa Clara is at least some indication that the
federal government's extension of sovereign immunity to the tribe may
not be as absolute as originally thought.
The second case, Akins v. Penobscot Nation,260 notes the recognition
that a tribe's sovereign immunity from actions seeking money damages
does not necessarily invoke Santa Clara.261 Akins involved a dispute be-
tween the Penobscot Indian nation and plaintiff Akins over the harvest-
ing of timber on lands acquired by the tribe.262 The tribe passed a law
stating that only members of the tribe, who were also residents of the
state of Maine, could gain "stumpage permits," or the legal right to har-
vest timber on land belonging to the tribe. Plaintiff was a recognized
member of the tribe and a resident of the State of Alabama. Plaintiff
sued the tribe, alleging that the new tribal rule violated his rights to due
process.2 63 The tribe claimed that its sovereign immunity precluded
plaintiff from stating a cause of action on which recovery might be based.
Plaintiff asserted that, in fact, the Fourteenth Amendment did apply, and
254. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 57. See also 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (West Supp. 2000).
Section 1302 provides that "No Indian tribe exercising powers of self-governnient shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws or deprive any
person of liberty or property without due process of law.. ." (emphasis added) Id.
255. 869 F. Supp. 1401 (E. D. Wis. 1994).
256. See id. at 1402.
257. See id. at 1405.
258. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
259. See id. at 516.
260. 130 F.3d 482 (1st Cir. 1997).
261. See id. at 489.
262. See id. at 483.
263. See id. at 484.
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that the stumpage right was created in conjunction with the state of
Maine.
Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment argument notwithstanding, the dis-
trict court concurred with the tribe and dismissed plaintiff's claim for fail-
ure to state a cause of action. Plaintiff appealed and lost again when the
decision was affirmed. However, in affirming the lower court's decision,
the 1st Circuit noted that the Penobscot Nation was not released from the
duty to uphold civil rights,264 and that through ICRA, Congress imposed
"restrictions on tribal governments similar, but not identical, to those em-
bodied in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 265 Despite
these holdings, the Court passed up an opportunity to call Santa Clara
into question by holding that Congress did not intend for ICRA to create
implied causes of action to redress substantive rights in federal court.2"'6
In essence, "if this is an internal tribal matter [and the court agreed that it
was], then the tribal court will have authority over the essence of the state
constitutional claims. ' 267 Today, the ruling in Santa Clara remains largely
undiluted.
VIII. SOLumON
Throughout my writing, I have been aware of the extremely fine line
that I have chosen to walk. On the one hand, I am not calling for the
complete destruction of tribal sovereignty. Indigenous systems of gov-
ernment are just as much a part of the culture of a tribe as religious cere-
monies or dances, and imposing foreign notions of government upon the
tribe destroys a part of that tribe's heritage. However, greed and abuse
of power are not unique to Western civilization. I originally concluded
this paper in a cowardly manner, by simply restating what I thought was
wrong and not proffering any solution. Insomnia and watching CNN at
3:00 a.m. challenged me to alter that conclusion. I contend that one pos-
sible solution can maintain the integrity of tribal sovereignty while also
ensuring some measure of fairness, and protection, for the individual tri-
bal member. The principles for this solution were born of tragic
circumstances.
On December 21, 1988, Pan American Airlines Flight 103 exploded out
of the sky and onto the Scottish village of Lockerbie.S The airplane
264. See id.
265. Id. (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 57 (1978)).
266. See id.
267. Id.
268. See Synopsis - Air Accidents Investigation Branch, Aircraft Accident Report No
2190 (EW/C1094) Report on the accident to Boeing 747-121, N739PA at Lockerbie, Dum-




crashed, killing 243 passengers, 16 crewmembers, and an additional 11
people who were killed when flight wreckage slammed into the Scottish
earth.269 By the Fall of 1989, local authorities working with the FBI had
identified suspects and determined that a bomb had caused the explo-
sion.z7° The United States, Britain and France had issued arrest warrants
for six Libyan agents by December 1991.271
Libyan leader Moamar Qadhafi initially balked at demands to turn
over the suspects. 272 However, after scores of sanctions crippled the
Lybian economy for much of the 1990s, 273 Libya accepted a plan by the
United States and Britain to put two suspects on trial in the Nether-
lands.274 Under the terms of this'compromise agreement, the suspects
were to be tried at an abandoned air base in The Netherlands by a tribu-
nal composed of Scottish judges applying Scottish law. 75
269. See Factual Information - 1.1 History of the Flight - Air Accidents Investigation
Branch, Aircraft Accident Report No 2/90 (EW/C1094) Report on the Accident to Boeing
747-121, N739PA at Lockerbie, Dumfriesshire, Scotland on 21December 1988 (last visited
Sept. 11, 2000) http://www.open.gov.uk/aaib/n739pa.html).
270. See Brian Duffy, On The Trail of Terror: Despite the Infighting Among Intelli-
gence Agencies, the 'Hicks' Fron Scotland are Closing in on Those Who Bombed Pan Am
103, U.S. News & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 13, 1989, at 44 (describing the combined efforts
of Scottish, American and other nations' intelligence agencies in determining the cause of
the Pan Am 103 disaster).
271. Eldad Beck, The Weakest Link: Experts in Europe Cast Doubt on Qadhafi's Re-
sponsibility for 7ivo Airline Bombings, THE JERUSALEM REPowr, Dec. 5, 1991, at 31
(describing the possible involvement of Lybian agents in the bombing of Pan Am 103).
272. See Michael Evans, Gadaffi Rejects Call on Pan Am Suspects, TIMtS NEWSI'A.
I'Eizs LIMITED, Nov. 29, 1991.
273. See Lee Michael Katz, U.N. Sanctions Press Libya, USA TODAY, Apr. 1, 1992, at
IA (describing the effects of the first round of U.N. sanctions: a ban on airline flights and
arms sales to Libya; compensation for the victims; and expulsion of Libyan diplomats); see
also Andrew Katell, UN Pressures Libya on Pan Am Bombing; New Sanctions Passed to
Force Suspects' Surrender, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 11, 1993, at Newsl (describing further
penalties imposed upon Libya for its refusal to turn over the Pan Am 103 suspects: a freeze
on Libya's financial assets in foreign banks and a prohibition on the sale of foreign oil
equipment); see also Richard Z. Chesnoff, He Just Keeps on Ticking, U.S. News & WORLD
REP'ORT, Feb. 21, 1994, at 55 (describing the effects of sanctions: "Air transport to or from
the desert land has been banned since 1992, causing massive traffic jams and deadly acci-
dents on the highways leading to Egypt and Tunisia. Spare parts fordomestic [sic] flights
are also embargoed, along with equipment for the petroleum industry and for the Libyan
military. And as of last December, most of Libya's billion dollars in known foreign assets
had been frozen solid... the once powerful Libyan dinar, still officially valued at $3, now
fetches as little as 33 cents on a thriving black market.")
274. Thomas W. Lippman and John M. Goshko, Libya OKs Hague trial for Pan Ain
Suspects, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 27, 1998, at 27.
275. See George Gedda, Libya Told, 'Take it or leave it' on Trial Site, CHI. SUN-TIMus,
Aug. 24, 1998, at 3 (stating Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's description of the terms
of the American-British compromise offer to Libya: "After consultatioons with the
Netherlands, we have concluded that such a trial is indeed possible. Accordingly, we have
[Vol. 3:71
CURSE OF THE NEW BUFFAL.0
While it is arguable that Libya's acquiescence to the American and
British compromise was mainly driven by economic concerns, at least
some attention was given to the possibility of the Libyan suspects not
receiving a fair trial in the U.S. or Britain.276 Although the solution pro-
posed by the United States and Britain was specifically crafted to address
Libya's concerns regarding a fair trial, the basic concept may be applica-
ble to the Indian reservations.
Any proposed solution must take into account two competing goals:
the preservation of tribal autonomy and tribal culture, and the need to
ensure justice for individual tribal members. Using the Lockerbie com-
promise as a model, it is not too difficult to imagine a tribunal created
and administered by the federal government through the BIA or as a unit
of the federal judiciary. This tribunal body would create a forum for indi-
vidual tribal members to appeal decisions that involve tribal law, but
which affect rights granted to individuals under the U.S. Constitution.
This sacrifice of tribal sovereignty would be the "give" that tribal govern-
ment would cede to the federal government in order to protect its mem-
bers from oppressions of the tribal government.
decided to go forward with the trial of the two suspects before a Scottish court, with Scot-
tish judges applying Scottish law." If Libya accepts the compromise offer, sanctions would
be suspended once the suspects are delivered to the Netherlands. If Libya refuses, efforts
would be made to increase the sanctions.).
276. See David Sapsted, UN Dismisses Lockerbie Suspects' Fair Trial Fear, DAMLY
TELEGRAPH (London), Dec. 23, 1997, at 10. The article states that: "In a setback to [Colo-
nel] Gaddafi's long-held position that the suspects would find it impossible to get a fair
trial in either the Britain [sic] or America [emphasis added], a UN report published yester-
day in New York states that accusations of prejudiced proceedings are groundless. Com-
piled by two international jurists, Prof Henry Schenners, of Leiden University, and Enoch
Dumbutshena, former Zimbabwe chief justice, the report states "that the accused would
receive a fair trial under the Scottish judicial system." Id. See also Lee Michael Katz,
Britain Rejects Neutral Site for Pan Am 103 Bomnb Trial, USA ToDAY, Aug. 26, 1997, at 8A.
Katz noted that Libya's United Nations ambassador, Abuzed Omar Dorda. wrote to U.S.
Attorney General Janet Reno to say that the Libyan suspects would not receive a fair trial
in Western courts. See id. Dorda alluded to Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma City
bomber, whose trial was moved to Denver to avoid jury prejudice. See id. See also Social-
ist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, The Question of Lockerbie: Position Paper, at http.//
www.un.int/libya/lockerl.htm (reporting official Libyan reservations to the trial of the Pan
Am 103 suspects in either Britain or the United States). The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
announced it had no objection to the two suspects appearing before the Scottish judiciary.
See id. But, British, Scottish, and Americans defense lawyers for the suspects, warned
them "against appearing in a court in any of the two countries because of the prior con-
demnation by the mass media, as well as by government officials in the two countries. See
id. Moreover Libya believes that the two Libyan suspects in the Lockerbie accident, have
also the right to stand before a just court at venue free from the atmosphere of prior
condemnation prevalent in the United States and in Scotland, as is the case with their
citizens, and as provided for in article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights. See id.
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To counterweight this "give," the "take" side of the equation would
require the tribunal to adhere to tribal law, whether codified on paper or
practiced as a matter of custom. This compromise would still leave the
individual tribe member subject to the sovereignty of tribal law and it
would preserve the legal components of tribal culture. Moreover, such a
tribunal would be removed from the prejudices and arbitrary whims of
the tribal judiciaries. This removal of local influence would both guaran-
tee a fair trial for the individual and preserve the integrity of the local
law.
IX. CONCLUSION
When examined from a non-Indian, western perspective, the solutions
to this dilemma seem blunt and simple: force the tribes, through an act of
Congress, to be accountable to the U.S. Constitution. After all, Navajos,
Cherokees, Nez Perces, Santa Clarans, Tiguas, Seminoles, Apaches, and
Choctaws are members of their respective tribes; but, they are Americans
as well. And just as a non-Indian city or state government owes its citi-
zens a constitutionally guaranteed right to due process, so, too, should the
tribes owe their members.
But such a solution ignores the greater dilemma affecting the United
States' relations with its native peoples: while non-Indian Americans de-
mand and expect certain rights because they are Americans, these native
peoples never asked to be Americans. That status was thrust upon them
after years of war, genocide, relocation and assimilation. Sovereignty and
the respect of that power is the least America can offer to its subjugated
peoples.
As time has progressed, attitudes have changed, and America now re-
alizes that there is value in the different cultures of its indigenous peo-
ples. These differences are worth preserving. That is why a full assault
on the notion of tribal sovereignty would be counter-productive and a
classic example of "destroying the village in order to save it." '27 7 It is
277. The quote "we had to destroy the village in order to save it" is attributed to an
anonymous U.S. officer in Vietnam during the Tet Offensive. It has become symbolic of
the absurdity of war, which calls for the destruction of that which the combatants seek to
defend. See Aleksandra Priestfield, Vietnam: A Retrospective - The Road to Wisdom,
Swans, at http://www.swans.com/library/art6/vnamO2.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2000). The
simplicity of the quote conveys a message so powerful that it is often used today to de-
scribe similar acts. See Gary Dempsey, Destroying Serbia in Order to Save It, Cato - TO-
day's Commentary, at http:/vww. cato.org/dailys/06-08-99.html. Dempsey highlights the
hypocrisy during the 1999 NATO air campaign against Serbia for its aggression in Kosovo,
in which President Clinton insists that the United States "has 'no quarrel with the Serbian
people,"' while bombing predominantly civilian targets. See id. Dempsey states
"[pierhaps [Gen. Klaus Naumann, chairman of NATO's military committee] intends to
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through the exercise of sovereignty that many tribes have been able to
maintain their cultural practices after years of federally sanctioned
repression.
Like all human creations, tribal sovereignty in its current incarnation is
not perfect. It has done a very capable job to preserve tribal culture and
identity, but the absolute, unquestionable authority vested in the tribal
governments has created the very situation which leads people to draft
written constitutions. Bluntly put, there is just too much money and not
enough accountability on many reservations for there not to be a repeat
of what occurred on the Tigua reservation.
The greatest difficulty in coming to any solution is the historical context
of the Indian in relation to the United States. The American federal gov-
ernment was neither wanted, needed, nor created by its indigenous peo-
ples; rather, it was imposed upon them. The Fourteenth Amendment and
other guarantees of the Constitution may be brilliant limitations on the
power of government, but they are still products of the oppressor.
Despite this historical baggage, clear facts cannot be ignored: there is
strong evidence that very serious wrongs were committed by the Tigua
tribal government against Marty Silvas, Grace Vela and others; that con-
temporary notions of tribal sovereignty have left these individuals with-
out any recourse to challenge their banishments; and their ability to do so
is a right they would have possessed had they not been Tigua. Whether
the Tigua represent the future of tribes awash in money, or are merely an
aberration, is unknown. What is likely, however, is that the sour fruit of
IGRA has not yet fully ripened. Therefore, American tribes which sur-
vived the 20th century must be accountable to two entities. They owe a
duty to the world to maintain their laws, customs and culture. And, they
owe a duty to their own tribal people to ensure that tribal law is enforced
fairly and justly. These two goals are not axiomatically oppositional and
need not be at odds with each other; the goals can be fulfilled.
replace the Vietnam-era contradiction, '[wle had to destroy the village in order to save it,'
with '[w]e had to destroy the country in order to save it.'" Id. I feel that this quote is
applicable to my position, that any attempt to resolve the lack of accountability under the
current understanding of tribal autonomy, by doing away with tribal autonomy altogether,
places indigenous customs and culture at sever risk of extinction.
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